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ABSTRACT

SEMANTIC ROLE AGENCY IN PERCEPTIONS OF THE LEXICAL
ITEMS SICK AND EVIL

Nathan Simmons
Department of Linguistic and English Language
Master of Art

Inspired by an ongoing debate in the clinical sciences concerning the value of evil
as a label for human behavior (Mowrer 1960, Staub 1999, Wellman 2000, Williams 2004
etc.), this thesis examines the semantic role of AGENT in the lexical items sick and evil.
Williams makes the argument that the label evil removes responsibility from the doctor,
whereas, the label sick empowers the doctor in bringing about a cure. While this view is
not universally accepted in the field, it does bring to light an interesting question in
applied linguistic semantics as to the assignment of agency with respect to sick and evil.
Based on the close association of the meanings of sick and evil that stems from historical,
psychological, and legal perspectives, this thesis assumes that the semantic feature [+/RESPONSIBILITY]

is assigned to either sick or evil at some point along a continuum. This

continuum establishes EVIL at one pole and receives [+RESPONSIBILITY] while SICK is at
the opposite pole and receives [-RESPONSIBILITY].

Using a variety of prompts to survey 106 respondents, the continuum model is
shown to be only partially true. There is a correlation between NON-RESPONSIBILITY and
SICK.

Also, a continuum exists that allows the assignment of PARTIAL RESPONSIBILITY to

both terms. However, there is no definitive significant correlation between
RESPONSIBILITY

and EVIL.

Further conclusions include the indication of adherence to a legal model of guilt,
innocence, and insanity in the general conceptions of SICK and EVIL. Also, demographic
variation shows little predictive potential in how people perceive SICK and EVIL. This
thesis concludes with a proposal for an alternative model using a Greimas Square to
represent the conceptions of SICK and EVIL that more appropriately fits the trends found in
the survey data.
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1
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. INTRODUCTION. This thesis appeals to applied linguistic semantics to
investigate the relationship between the words sick and evil in terms of how people use
them to define responsibility for actions. These words have been closely associated
throughout history, as will be discussed later in this chapter. However, contemporary
views of society on the relationship between these terms seem to vacillate among the
various steps between a causal relationship and no relationship.
Establishing a line that defines the separation between evil-motivated actions and
sickness-motivated actions can prove difficult. The professional fields that address such
behavior and hinge on such definitions, in particular psychology and law (though it may
extend to other fields), are frequently mired in debate as to what results from sickness and
what results from evil. For example, the degree of responsibility that an addict has for
crimes depends entirely on whether addiction is viewed as a disease or as a moral
infraction (Morse 2000, Herbert 1975).
Labeling something or someone evil according to Williams (2004) removes the
responsibility for curing that evil away from the medical professional. To be useful, she
argues, evil must give way to labels like sick, ill, etc. A person no longer commits evil
actions, but instead suffers from a mental illness that can, somehow, be cured. Mowrer
(1960) attributes the beginning of the debates that pit disease models against moral
models to Freud’s theories on psychoanalysis and suggests that, even in 1960, the case
for evil as a motivator for misconduct had already been lost. However, the debate still
continues as seen in the work of Staub (1999), and Wellman (2000). Staub argues that the
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concept of EVIL “could lead … to more focused exploration of the characteristics of
persons, cultures, and situations that lead to harm-doing [e.g. genocide, group violence,
bullying, peer pressure, sexual abuse, and inaction]” (181). Wellman (2000), similarly,
condemns the “medicalization of racism” (meaning in effect, to brand racism as a kind of
sickness) and criticizes the various disease models used to explain it.
This leaves us with the question: What is the current cultural meaning of evil and
how does it differ from the current cultural meaning of sick? While this debate has arisen
almost entirely in psychology, the answer itself requires an appeal to the meanings of the
words and their effects. In other words, this issue can be thought of as a problem in
applied linguistic semantics. This thesis explores aspects of theoretical frameworks used
to describe meaning. Then, using the concepts of semantic features and thematic roles as
a basis for analysis, this thesis describes my empirical study used to determine the
semantic and usage differences between the concepts of SICK and EVIL, as represented by
the words sick and evil.
I hypothesize that the word evil assigns the semantic role of AGENT primarily to the
subject, whereas the word sick (in modern usage) assign agency to an argument other
than the subject and that this assignment of agency is based on the semantic feature [+/RESPONSIBILITY].
RESPONSIBILITY

Furthermore, sick and evil establish poles at each end of continuum of

and certain behaviors can therefore be considered both sick and evil

simultaneously.
In terms of psychology, this assignment of agency to the subject, in the case of
evil, has the effect of deferring responsibility for curing the patient away from the
psychologist, but places that responsibility on the patient. However, in the case of sick, a
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person is presumed to have much less, possibly none, of the responsibility/agency for
being sick. Thus, agency is not assigned to the subject but to an entity other than the
arguments contained in the sentence.
The final section of this introduction will give an overview of historical
perceptions of the concepts of SICK and EVIL and how these perceptions have changed to
shape the current view. The second chapter presents a review of literature dealing with
semantic theories and will offer insight into how these theories apply to the relationship
of SICK and EVIL using treatment of these concepts in religion, psychology, and law as a
basis for conjecture concerning role assignment. The third chapter outlines a study that
surveys public perception of these concepts in order to define the separation and overlap
of the meaning of each. The forth chapter analyzes the data collected from the survey.
The fifth chapter presents the conclusions drawn from the data and explains their
significance.

1.2. A DIACHRONIC VIEW OF SICK AND EVIL. Attitudes toward illness and evil in
pre-modern times tend to equate the two concepts. Kahn (1990) makes no distinction
between them when discussing the healing process in pre-modern societies: “pain and
evil could be expelled directly … or indirectly ….” (79). He further reports the attitudes
of pre-modern societies to illness and evil as both being contained by the term
misfortune:
Primitive people attributed all misfortune – political, economic, social,
physiological, and psychological – to the magic of enemies or the whimsy of
wicked spirits. Believing that evil caused all pain, they took recourse in rites and
rituals devised to rid individuals or whole communities of accumulated suffering
(79).
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Bloom (2005), similarly, notes that even modern pre-industrialized societies tend to share
the perception of illness described in the previous example: “many cultures define illness
as punishment for ill-willed behavior toward a deity, a spiritual ancestor, or a competitor”
(251).
The congruency of the meanings of sick and evil is also seen clearly in historical
records. This similarity comes through particularly in religious texts, no doubt due to the
substantial religious implications of evil and its coexistence with sin and other terms that
express moral infractions. A passage from the Bible presents our first example, “And as
Jesus passed by, he saw a man which was blind from his birth. And his disciples asked
him, saying, Master, who did sin, this man, or his parents, that he was born blind?” (John
8:1-2, KJV). Here we see a causal relationship assumed by the people asking the
questions. The man is blind for a reason and that reason must be sin. Therefore, according
to this approach, SICKNESS is the consequence of EVIL.
Centuries later, we see evidence that this causal perspective has amplified to the
point that EVIL is caused by external forces. One of Shakespeare’s characters attributes
EVIL

to astrological forces, as seen in this passage of King Lear:
We make guilty of our disasters the sun, the moon, and the stars; as if we were
villains on necessity; fools by heavenly compulsion; knaves, thieves, and
treachers by spherical predominance; drunkards, liars, and adulterers by an
enforc’d obedience of planetary influences (1.2.134-140).

This citation is of particular interest because it assigns agency to external forces for moral
misconduct. However, it is clear from the citation above that Shakespeare, though
recognizing the popularity of this view, also takes issue with it through satire. This same
type of causality is seen with the concept of ILLNESS through the etymology of influenza:
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Italian influenza has the same meaning as its English cognate influence. But in the
fifteenth century, sudden epidemics whose earthly causes were not apparent were
blamed on the influenza of the stars. The report of a Roman epidemic which
spread through much of Europe in 1743 brought the word to England (Mish 1991,
143).
The term influenza suggests an outside agency, such as astrological alignments. These
two, roughly contemporaneous, examples show that by the 18th century, if not
significantly sooner, responsibility for both EVIL and ILLNESS had been moved away from
the sufferer to external forces: astrology in both of these examples.
It is notable that the examples cited above rely on a set of culturally held beliefs in
order to explain the phenomenon of sickness. We can glean from this that prior to the
various discoveries of medical science leading to the ability to diagnose and treat illness,
the conventions of society left explanations of the unexplainable, sickness in particular, to
the prevailing religious and superstitious beliefs.
Before the rise of scientific medicine, it was obvious that certain people suddenly
became feverish, wasted, and delirious. Then, with some good fortune, they
would return to their previous state. The inference was that something had gone
wrong, which was often attributed to demonic possession or witchcraft (Klein
1999:422).
The implication of this is that any affliction a person might suffer is a kind of retribution
for evil committed.
Besserman (1989), citing the Oxford English Dictionary, also notes that, at times,
there has been complete synonymy between ill and evil:
Although ill is not etymologically related to evil, the two words have from the
twelfth century been synonymous, and ill has been often viewed as a mere variant
or reduced form of evil. The definitions of ill before it came to mean “sick”
include “morally evil”, “depraved”, “vicious” … (370).
Furthermore, Besserman asserts that “the word sick … even in Anglo-Saxon times …
took on, by metaphoric extension, additional pejorative meanings, including: ‘spiritually
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or morally ailing; corrupt through sin or wrongdoing’ (OED s.v. 11.3)” and still
maintains many of these meanings (370-1).
Despite the close relationship between evil and sick illustrated by these examples,
modern medical discoveries have reversed the perceived causal relationship between the
two concepts. Before, it was commonly thought that evil caused sickness, but now the
paradigmatic view is that sickness causes evil by influencing mental stability leading to
the commission of crimes. This reversal of presumed cause-effect is likely due to the
modern assumption that the medical field has a fairly complete understanding of physical
well-being. This presumption may overvalue actual medical advancement (Bloom
2005:258) but, although some physical illnesses remain uncured, they are still, the
modernist assumes, largely understood. According to Scheurich (2002), we have cured
most diseases capable of being cured and that “most modern diseases are chronic and
more likely to be managed than cured” (16). Mowrer (1960) summarizes the status of the
medical fields with: “Authority and power ought to go with demonstrated competence,
which medicine clearly has in the physical realm but, equally clearly, does not have in
‘psychiatry’” (302).
We may conclude that the assignment of causal agency reliably follows the
perception of greater power or control. In pre-modern times, religion dominated the
thinking of educated people. The principles of morality were thought to be well
understood, but the causes of physical illness were not. Therefore the hypothesis that
disordered morality caused disordered physicality seemed to be the most logical. In the
modern age, the situation is exactly reversed. The principles of physical well-being are
thought to be well understood, but the nature of, or even the reality of, moral rightness is

7
hotly debated. Therefore, the hypothesis that disordered physicality causes disordered
morality seems to be the most logical.
The majority of the, as yet, unexplained ailments that remain in the medical
industry are found within the mind. That is, many of the causes and treatments of mental
illness still elude health care professionals because of the difficulty of examining a
patient’s mind. Mental concepts such as free will, accountability, etc. are only explained
inasmuch as they are able to be brought into the realm of physicality. Scheurich (2002)
summarizes this process:
For much of history, free will seemed most limited by the decrees of fate, by the
meddling of the gods, or by God’s foreknowledge of human actions, but with the
rise of modern science, the chief threat to free will has come from the aggressive
reduction of mind to brain (16).
This change in perspective is evident by modern attempts to explain historical
accounts of evil-induced-sickness such as the hallucinations experienced by the victims of
the “witches” in 17th century Salem, Massachusetts. Modern explanations include grain
stores infested with hallucinogenic fungus (Caporeal 1976), diseases such as encephalitis
lethargica (Carlson 1999), or simply fraud (Spanos and Gottlieb 1976). Modern
explanations do not include the explanation given by the people living in Salem at this
time: witchcraft.
However, the issue as to who is responsible for illness has yet to be resolved.
There are those who argue that “the sick man himself creates his disease” (Besserman
1989:386) and assign the patient responsibility for being sick. Similarly, some argue that
the healing process benefits from patient participation and therefore assigns the patient a
degree of responsibility for bringing about a cure. Bloom (2005) supports this view:
“There are several areas of modern research that support the value of providing an
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explanation of the disease process and some opportunity for the patient and family to do
something about the illness” (55). That is, patients have some ability to affect a cure
when the process is explained.
While the previous discussion has tried to indicate and generalize trends in
perception, it should be apparent that a precise definition of the concepts of SICK and EVIL
is difficult to determine. Besserman very appropriately summarizes the historical
attitudes toward sickness with:
In the confusion (or call it the variety) of terms for being sick in English, one
finds a reflex of centuries and more of confused (or call them various) ways of
thinking about illness: as divine punishment, random biological accident, or
psychosomatic response. We have never known for sure, and our language
reflects our uncertainty and imperfect knowledge, our magical thinking and wishfulfillments, alongside our more neutral observations of the way things really are,
or seem to be (1989:371-2).
The variety of definition described above demonstrates the vacillating relationship that
sickness holds with evil. While obtaining a precise definition of any word is difficult due
to the complexity of language and contextual influences, defining the relationship
between sick and evil reduces the scope of inquiry to the difference, if any, that separates
these two words. Specifically, this thesis intends to explore what function each term plays
in usage and how each term affects its corresponding subject. The next chapter will
explore applicable linguistic literature and discuss the possibilities of formulating better
working descriptions of the relationship between sick and evil based on that literature.
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2.1. INTRODUCTION. This thesis builds on the assumption that establishing the
meaning of any particular word is best determined by refining the focus of inquiry. That
is, the more specific the definition of meaning, the more likely an investigation of
meaning is to yield reliable results. In order to investigate the meaning of the words sick
and evil, this thesis looks specifically at the aspect of meaning that involves assigning the
thematic role AGENT to an argument by the stative adjective sick or evil based on the
semantic feature [+/-RESPONSIBILITY]. As justification for these assumptions, this chapter
presents a general review of semantic literature that treats such aspects of meaning as
thematic role assignment, stative adjectives, and semantic features. The first section gives
an overview of general semantic theory and points out the difficulty inherent in
developing a theory of meaning and the benefit of specificity in pursuing word meanings.
The second section reviews research on thematic roles and presents arguments for the use
of semantic features in defining roles as well as the possibility of stative adjectives
motivating argument assignment. The third section demonstrates the application of the
thematic role discussion to sick and evil. The fourth section considers the perspectives
that religion, law, and psychology could have on how thematic roles are assigned to sick
and evil. The final section reviews several methods for gathering data.

2.2. DEFINING MEANING. The search for a theory of meaning that produces
complete, accurate, and definitive descriptions of word usage has generally shown that
such descriptions are extremely elusive. This is because meaning is heavily dependant on
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context, interpretation, and the mutual understanding of numerous individuals who use a
variety of independent experiences to evaluate and refine their understanding of any
particular term. Research into meaning, therefore, tends to focus on some specified aspect
of meaning. In defining meaning, then, success depends largely on the purpose of the
research. Naturally, differences of purpose and interest in varying aspects of meaning
have given rise to various approaches and definitions of meaning.
Some of the earliest research into defining meaning is found in the philosophical
writings of Plato. He uses the Platonic dialogue in his approach to defining words by
asking questions with two options as in this excerpt taken from Plato’s Sophist as quoted
in Allen (2001):
Is angling not a skill or a skill?
It is a skill.
Is the angler a creator or an acquirer?
An acquirer.
Is the acquisition by consent or capture?
By capture.
Is it open-capture or stealthy capture?
Stealthy capture.
Is it capture of nonliving or of living things?
Of living things.
Are the living things land animals or water animals?
Water animals.
Are the water animals caught waterfowl or fish?
Fish.
Are the fish caught by a net or by striking a blow?
By striking a blow.
Is this done by using fire at night or by using barbs in the day-time?
Using barbs by day.
Are the fish struck by a trident from above or struck from below with a hook?
From below, with a hook (25-26).
The dialogue above shows a series of binary options presented to the examinee to
determine the nature of “angling.” Specifically, Plato’s “purpose was to fix what a
contemporary angler did to merit the title aspalieutes,” in other words, the qualities that
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activated the use of the Greek term for a fisherman. Plato is essentially presenting
possible semantic features that, combined, will make up a rough definition of what
“angling” means (25-26). Though this does not, necessarily, demonstrate Plato’s working
theory or definition of meaning, it does indicate an approach to determining meaning
through the use of a specific focus: semantic features. The use of semantic features to
determine meaning exemplifies the need to refine the specific aspects of meaning that are
being investigated. The nature of semantic features allows comparison between certain
aspects of words. If certain semantic features are shared among two words, they can be
said to be synonyms. If opposing features are shared among two words, they can be said
to be antonyms. Semantic features are an important aspect of investigating meaning
because they allow the researcher to compare words on a basic level. However, one
cannot hope to compile a complete list of all semantic features of a word due to the
infinite number of aspects, features, or characteristics of that word’s meaning. Semantic
features will be discussed more at length later in this chapter as they pertain to the
discussion of thematic roles. For now, “it is sufficient to say … that semantic features are
a necessity, not a luxury, for any person attempting to get at the basis of meaning”
(Nilsen and Nilsen 1975:86).
Further justification for the claim that inquiry into the meanings of certain words
requires refinement comes from the framework of the field itself. Through time, the
various frameworks of semantic inquiry have diverged establishing different perspectives
on their individual pursuits. Fodor and LePore (1993) describe this divergence:
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It’s an achievement of the last couple of decades that people who work in
linguistic semantics and people who work in the philosophy of language have
arrived at a friendly de facto agreement as to their respective job descriptions. The
terms of this agreement are that the semanticists do the work and the philosophers
do the worrying. The semanticists try to construct actual theories of meaning (or
truth theories, or model theories, or whatever) for one or another kind of
expression in one or another natural language …. The philosophers, by contrast,
keep an eye on the large, foundational issues, such as: what’s the relation between
sense and denotation; what’s the relation between thought and language; whether
translation is determinate; and whether life is like a fountain (15).
Though partially tongue-in-cheek, this statement indicates an ideological shift between
the two major fields pursuing semantic studies: linguistics and philosophy.
Despite this separation, there is still a great deal of overlap between these two
fields. As Harris (1993) states, “many of the most substantial contributions [to
understanding meaning] have come from philosophers” (12). Wittgenstein, for example,
provides definitions of meaning that could easily be accepted by linguists:
Wittgenstein’s understanding is clear, a definition – verbal or ostensive – is
important only to the extent that it tells us how to use a word. Explanations of
meaning are no explanations at all if they do not tell us how to use a word. With
such an understanding Wittgenstein defines the meaning of a word as its use in
language (Brown 1976:390-1; italics added).
Definitions of this sort imply a focus on the contextual environment in which we find a
word rather than simply its definition (Harris 1993). Fodor and LePore (1993) emphasize
this point by referring to the philosophically perennial “Morning/Evening Star”
illustration:
The expressions “the Morning Star” and “the Evening Star” mean different things,
despite their both being attached to Venus, because they have different roles in
the (English) language. Frege says “only in the context of a sentence does a word
have meaning” and Wittgenstein adds to that “to understand a sentence is to
understand a language” (18).
This statement describes meaning as intrinsically attached to context, to the point that
meaning does not exist outside of that context. Although it may be a bit extreme to claim

13
that meaning exists “only in context”, it cannot be denied that context has an extremely
powerful effect on meaning.
Katz, who also spans the gap addressing papers both to philosophers (1964) and
linguists (1980), implies a wide variety of definitions for meaning as he declares his
intended definitions as:
…not some specially concocted notion; it is the ordinary, pretheoretical one
employed when either linguists or non-linguists speak of words as having the
same meaning (being synonymous), of sentences as being meaningful or
meaningless (being semantically deviant or non-deviant), of expressions as having
more than one meaning (being ambiguous), of noun phrases as being redundant,
and so on. Other uses of ‘meaning’ occur in ordinary speech, but they are not
matters of linguistic structure. For example, people sometimes say Smoke means
fire; Freud discovered the meaning of verbal slips; The decline and fall of Rome
has meaning for contemporary America; Bogart and Bergman both meant a great
deal to Woody Allen. But references to causal significance, underlying intention,
historical lesson, and life importance are extra-linguistic (1980:1-2).
Here, Katz distinguishes between linguistic and non-linguistic definitions of meaning
(obviously preferring linguistic meaning).
There is a sometimes indistinguishable separation between philosophical and
linguistic semantics. However, despite this, and the relevance of philosophy to issues of
morality (Katz 1964, Wedgwood 2001) and the existence of evil (Berguno 2006), it is the
linguists who “do the work,” as Fodor and LePore pointed out earlier. That is to say, the
task of defining words moves away from the philosophies and theories on meaning into
more empirical pursuits. Modern linguists have made great strides in semantic studies,
and it is to modern linguistic approaches that we will turn to further our understanding of
the meanings and relationship of SICK and EVIL.
Certainly most, if not all, attempts to describe a theory or model of meaning have
met with criticism, which may lead one to question the validity of any particular
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approach. It would seem that the most accurate definition of any word is that word itself.
Of course, a theory on meaning that proposes nothing beyond this definitional circularity
provides no insight into meaning and leads nowhere in terms of increased understanding
of the target word.
According to C.S. Peirce, such pure circularity is avoidable, but the definition of
words in terms of other words is not:
The meaning of a representation can be nothing but a representation. In fact, it is
nothing but the representation itself conceived as stripped of irrelevant clothing.
But this clothing never can be completely stripped off; it is only changed for
something more diaphanous (CP 1.339).
Therefore, in order to approach meaning, it is necessary sometimes to accept a degree of
vagueness or generality (i.e. the diaphanous) in a definition, in exchange for the stripping
away of irrelevant detail. With that in mind, this thesis refines its intended definition of
meaning to focus on the thematic roles potentially assigned by sick and evil and how that
assignment of roles is affected by the semantic feature [+/- RESPONSIBILITY].

2.3. THEMATIC ROLES. The difficulty inherent in defining meaning overflows into
the definitions of the tools used by semanticists. Specifically, there is much disagreement
among researchers as to the proper inventory, determination, and application of
THEMATIC ROLES

(also referred to as semantic roles, θ-roles, and thematic relations). As

Dowty (1991) puts it,
There is perhaps no concept in modern syntactic and semantic theory which is so
often involved in so wide a range of contexts, but on which there is so little
agreement as to its nature and definition, as THEMATIC ROLE (or THEMATIC
RELATION ) and its derivative, THETA-ROLE in Government-Binding (GB) theory”
(547).
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Dowty further points out that “many linguists seem to assume that linguistic theory
should include a finite … language-universal canon of thematic roles” (548). Despite this
assumption, thematic role theory has its detractors for reasons that Levin and Rappaport
Hovav (2005) point out:
The use of semantic roles has been criticized because it is difficult to find reliable
diagnostics for isolating precisely those arguments bearing a particular role. There
do not seem to be diagnostic tests which can be consistently applied to an
argument with relatively uncontroversial results to determine whether that
argument bears a particular role in the way that there are tests for, say, lexical and
syntactic categories (38).
Subsequently, many articles on the subject attempt to clarify, refine, expand, simplify,
etc. the previous theories and definitions. While an exhaustive review is beyond the scope
of this thesis, this section will address some aspects of these theories and how they relate
to the sick/evil relationship.

DEFINING THEMATIC ROLES. Thematic roles are relatively new, being introduced
by Gruber in 1965 as thematic relations and showing significant correspondence to
Fillmore’s DEEP CASES (1966,1968). There are also aspects that refer back to “ideas of
structuralists such as Frank Blake (1930), and ultimately to Pāņini’s kārakas” (Dowty
1991:548). An obvious “syntax-semantics interface” motivated work with thematic roles
in both fields of syntax and semantics with Chomsky introducing the concept into
Government-Binding theory, and Jackendoff, “the only semanticist who has studied the
concept extensively,” developing a semantic approach (Dowty 548).
The traditional list of roles defined by linguists tends to consist of AGENT (John
kicked the ball), Patient (John kicked the ball), Goal (John kicked the ball to the tree),
Source (John kicked the ball from the house to the tree), Experiencer (The ball hit John),
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etc. However, there is seldom complete agreement of terms when attempting to compile a
complete list. New roles are frequently proposed to address inadequate descriptions of an
argument’s function in a sentence. A few examples of proposed roles are: NEUTRAL
(Rozwadowska 1988), LANDMARK (Jackendoff 1982), and SUBJECT (Baker 1985) (taken
from Dowty 1991:549). Even Dowty, after discussing this inconsistency, later proposes
the new role of INCREMENTAL THEME.
There have also been a number of attempts to collapse two or more roles into
larger categories or suggesting that two roles do not present enough distinction to merit
separate categories. A few of these proposals include (taken from Dowty 1991:599):
(1) Foley and Van Valin (1984) – Macro-roles: all thematic roles are entailed by
the ACTOR and UNDERGOER roles
(2) Talmy (1985) and Culicover & Wilkins (1986) – Separate thematic roles into
2 tiers: Action Tier (AGENT, PAITENT) and Motion Tier (THEME, SOURCE,
GOAL); with Jackendoff (1983) adding Temporal Tier (aspect and other time
adverbials)
(3) Keenen (1976, 1984) – all thematic roles are entailed by SUBJECT and
ABSOLUTIVE roles
(4) Dowty (1991) – all thematic roles are entailed by the Proto-Roles: PROTOAGENT and PROTO-PATIENT
The variation that appears in the literature regarding Thematic Roles likely stems
from the way in which roles are categorized. There is a tendency to define roles in terms
of semantic features (Rozwadowska 1988, Zaenen 1988). Nilsen and Nilsen (1975:98)
exemplify this by defining AGENT with the features [+ANIMATE] and [+CAUSE],
EXPERIENCER with the features [+ANIMATE] and [+EFFECT], INSTRUMENT with the
features [+INANIMATE] and [+CAUSE], and OBJECT with the features [+INANIMATE] and
[+EFFECT] as seen in Figure 2.1 below:
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Deep Case
Inherent Feature
Relational Feature
AGENT
ANIMATE
CAUSE
EXPERIENCER
ANIMATE
EFFECT
INSTRUMENT
INANIMATE
CAUSE
OBJECT
INANIMATE
EFFECT
Figure 2.1: Semantic features defining roles
This limited set of categories is easily differentiated by the simple binary distinctions
provided in the chart. However, the lines may become a bit blurry if we included a role
such as PATIENT in the set. PATIENT would likely be assigned the roles [+ANIMATE] and
[+EFFECT] and becomes indistinguishable from EXPERIENCER. If we feel that the role of
Patient merits distinction from the role of EXPERIENCER it becomes necessary to add
additional features. It is easy to see how a slight increase in the number of categories in a
set of roles can quickly complicate feature assignment. Despite this difficulty, Nilsen and
Nilsen are loathe to disregard the importance of semantic features:
Although semantic features are extremely complex, they must be directly dealt
with because it is through semantic features that we can determine how closely
various lexical items are related to each other. The compatibility of two lexical
items is a function of the compatibility of the features of these two items
(1975:85).
Though Dowty (1991) rejects the “phraseology” of semantic features due to the reality of
unclear category boundaries, his Proto-roles essentially divide up the sets of features into
two lists as shown in Figure 2.2 (as summarized by Levin and Rappaport Hovav 2005:5354).
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Contributing
properties for the
Agent Proto-Role:

- volitional involvement in the event or state
- sentience (and/or perception)
- causing an event or change of state in another participant
- movement (relative to the position of another participant)
- exists independently of the event named by the verb
Contributing
- undergoes change of state
properties for the
- incremental theme
Patient Proto-Role:
- causally affected by another participant
- stationary relative to movement of another participant
- does not exist independently of the event, or not at all
Figure 2.2: Summary of Dowty’s Proto-Role properties.
Dowty assigns an argument to either the PROTO-AGENT or PROTO-PATIENT according to
which list corresponds to the majority of that argument’s entailments (it is not necessary
that an argument possess all of the properties of either Proto-Role and can contain
properties from both). Although the properties listed above can easily be reduced to
standard semantic feature format (i.e. evaluating an argument for the PROTO-AGENT
“features” could appear as: [+/-VOLITIONAL], [+/-SENTIENT], [+/-CAUSAL], [+/MOVEMENT],

and [+/-EXISTENTIAL]), this approach still serves Dowty’s purpose of

avoiding rigidity among category boundaries by allowing an argument to entail features
from both sets of properties. As Dowty summarizes: “The variety of semantic distinctions
that correlate with syntactic and lexical patterns in one way or another is surely
enormous. To postulate thematic role types for each of them is, quite possibly, to dilute
the notion beyond its usefulness” (1991:561).
Dowty’s reductionist approach to thematic roles is well-suited to this thesis due to
the narrow scope of its investigation. In fact, this thesis is really only interested in
defining one role, that of AGENT. In particular, this thesis hopes to find that the AGENT
role is assigned to the subject by evil but not by sick. While one might assume that failure
to assign the AGENT role to an argument would lead to a default assignment of the
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PATIENT role, indeed this is what Dowty implies, I have limited the definition of agency
to the presence of the semantic feature [+ RESPONSIBLE]. Therefore, I do not attempt to
assign any roles but AGENT, as any role that does not bear this semantic feature is left
undefined.
The justification of reducing the definition of AGENT to [+RESPONSIBLE] lies in
the focus of our research. Ultimately, this thesis is trying to discover whether the subject
of sick or evil is responsible his or her behavior while in a state of evil or sickness.
Responsibility for behavior implies the various definitions for AGENT that have been
discussed above. These are: causation, volition, animacy, sentience, etc. However, these
terms, individually, are too specific and use a high register that may complicate the
survey instrument discussed in Chapter 3. Therefore, this thesis focuses on the term
responsibility as a simplified summary of the various definitions given for AGENT.

ARGUMENT ASSIGNMENT. Argument assignment is typically considered to be
governed by the verb. That is, each verb carries a certain number of roles that it can
assign to the arguments in the sentence. For example, the verb kiss is a “two-place
predicate” and assigns the roles AGENT and OBJECT. Give is a three place predicate and
assigns the roles AGENT, EXPERIENCER, and OBJECT (Nilsen and Nilsen 1975:91). This
simple description implies a one-to-one correspondence between arguments and roles.
However, many researchers argue against such a correspondence (Levin and Rappaport
Hovav 2005). Jackendoff (1987), for example, argues that some verbs assign multiple
roles to just one argument, some assign one role to multiple arguments, and some verbs
assign roles to no arguments. This means, for example, that the subject of a sentence can
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be both the AGENT and the SOURCE or can consist of multiple arguments each being the
AGENT. This also means that some roles are assigned to no argument at all.
Another trend that has been largely redirected is the tendency to assign a subject
the role of AGENT and an object the role of PATIENT:
Since agent-patient verbs constitute a significant part of the class of transitive
verbs of every language and are so uniform in their argument realization, many
theories of argument realization make direct reference to the semantic roles agent
and patient—or its relative theme—and have rules which explicitly realize agents
as subjects and patients as objects. However, these simple statements are
misleading for two reasons. First, ‘agent’ and ‘patient’ are not the only semantic
notions associated with subject and object. Second, subject and object often have
multiple morphosyntactic realizations, and a complete theory of argument
realization needs to take this into consideration (Levin and Rappaport Hovav
2005:24).
Subsequently, much literature has been dedicated to pointing out the flexibility linguists
have in identifying thematic roles associated with almost any noun phrase in a sentence.
Nilsen and Nilsen (1975:93-95) have a very thorough list of example sentences assigning
each of fifteen separate roles to a multitude of nominal arguments. Levin and Rappaport
Hovav (2005:24-32) likewise dedicate eight pages to supplying discussion of the variety
of roles that can be assigned to any particular part-of-speech. This flexibility is necessary
to the success of this thesis since the typical sentence structure used in describing
something as sick or evil is: “<subject> is sick” or “<subject> is evil.” If we were to
assume that all subjects were AGENTS, there would be no possibility of further discussion.

PREDICATION FROM NON-VERBS. So far, the discussion has focused entirely on
verb-controlled role assignment. However, some researchers believe that thematic roles
exist beyond those governed by the verb. Barker (1998) argues that “it is quite possible a
priori that nominal expressions in general have their own characteristic thematic system
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that is ultimately independent of the verbal one” (696). This is a step beyond previous
theories that, if they allowed for nominal thematic roles at all, they considered them
derived from the verbal structure (695).
Similarly, there appears to be a blurring of the lines between syntactic categories
in general, which indicates further transference of thematic role assignment beyond verbs
to adjectives. Stative adjectives, in particular, are capable of thematic role assignment.
Stative adjectives are adjectives that describe a state of being (such as red, alive, or
intelligent) and contrast with active (or dynamic) adjectives, which describe qualities
capable of change (such as brave, calm, or rude). A large amount of research has been
performed that supports this phenomenon in other languages (Denny 1978, Huehnergard
1987, Mithun 1991, Ross 1998), as well as English. Givón (1970:816), citing research by
Ross and Lakoff (1967:15), states that:
English adjectives, much like English verbs, seem to divide into stative and active
ones. After showing great parallelism in the syntactic behavior of the two classes,
using various test frames, Ross & Lakoff concluded that there existed “strong
evidence for the assertion that what traditional grammarians called adjectives and
verbs are really members of the same major grammatical category …” (830).
What adjectives and verbs have in common is that both categories ascribe properties (as
predicates) to at least one referring expression (as argument). Transference of the
predication properties from a linking verb like is/seems/appears to a stative adjective
(like sick or evil) is likely due to the lack of semantic elements of the linking verb.
Even though to be is the most common stative verb (McIntosh 1977:111), it can
do little in terms of communicating semantic information. Because of this, Nilsen and
Nilsen (1975:88) propose that stative adjectives assign the thematic role: “Because of the
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fact that is …has basically a grammatical function, we will not consider it the predicator.
Instead we will think of the word tall as the predicator in [the sentence John is tall].”
Because neither sick nor evil commonly act as verbs, it is necessary to consider
the possibility that parts of speech other than verbs can assign thematic roles to
arguments. The next section defines both sick and evil as stative adjectives and discusses
more in depth their potential for motivating argument assignment.

2.4. APPLICATION OF ROLES TO SICK/EVIL. The previous discussion concerning
stativity and how thematic roles are assigned is directly applicable to sick and evil. Both
of these terms are stative adjectives as evidenced by their failure to pass the progressive
test as defined by McIntosh (1977), “If a predicate sounds odd or un-English in the
progressive … we shall call it stative” (111). Example 2.1 below demonstrates how sick
and evil demonstrate failure of this test (the first set of sentences is an example taken
from McIntosh to demonstrate success and failure of the test):
Example 2.1
(1)
a. The girl is healthy.
b. *The girl is being healthy.
c. The girl is noisy.
d. The girl is being noisy.
(2)

a. John is sick.
b. ?John is being sick.
c. John is evil.
d. ?John is being evil.

The first set of instances demonstrates how a stative adjective like healthy cannot be used
in the progressive, while a dynamic adjective like noisy can. The second set of instances
applies this test to sick and evil. Both fail the progressive test; although, in the case of
sick, there is also a dynamic interpretation (synonymous with gross or disgusting) that
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allows acceptability. Likewise there is a modern colloquial reading of being evil
(synonymous with difficult or uncooperative). However, these interpretations are
unrelated to the concepts of mental illness and moral choice that this paper focuses on.
As previously stated, Nilsen and Nilsen allocate to the stative adjective the
function of role assignment. They further argue that this assignment is limited to the role
of OBJECT. “The reason that John is an OBJECT in ‘John is tall,’ and an AGENT in ‘John
snores,’ is that in the latter sentence John is doing something. Snoring is an action while
being tall is a state” (100). However, in defining the features of an OBJECT, Nilsen and
Nilsen include [-ANIMATE] (98). Since John is very likely animate, we will assume that
Nilsen and Nilsen assign him the OBJECT role because he is inanimate in terms of his
ability to make himself tall. That is, there is no animate act that John can do to increase
his height.
However, if the subject of a stative adjective can influence its state, there should
be some flexibility as to its assigned thematic role. Mithum (1991) argues this point,
“Arguments of inherent-state predicates [in Central Pomo, a Native American language]
are cast as grammatical agents” (521). Mithum also gives several examples of this type of
inherent-state predicate: “I’m strong”, “I’m good”, “I’m alive”, etc. Argument realization
is much clearer in Central Pomo since the arguments are marked with morphemic
indicators of their semantic role. While there is no reason to assume that the arguments
for English stative predicates will act similarly, these examples open the possibility for
consideration, since English arguments receive no such morphological denotation. Figure
2.3 shows a proposed list of stative adjectives that may be subject to influence from an
agentive argument:
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Stative adjectives influenced
by subject
Hungry
thirsty
humble
unbeatable
Figure 2.3. Variation of stativity

Stative adjectives
partially influenced
angry
intelligent
unforgivable
fearful

Stative adjective not
influenced by subject
frozen
tall
short
bald

It would seem that in many situations, a person, because of his/her animacy, is able to
change his/her state. There is, of course, room for debate as to which states are able to be
influenced and to what degree, especially when it comes to emotional and mental states.
With sick and evil defined as stative adjectives, and with the assumption that each arises
from mental influences, we are left with the subsequent task of determining to what
degree these states can be influenced, if at all.

2.5. EXTERNALLY IMPLIED ROLE ASSIGNMENT. In the case of evil as a stative
adjective and from the perspective of theology, there seems to be little disagreement that
a person has control over his/her state of evil or good. This is apparent in many of the
world’s religions (Palmer et al. 1997) including:
(1) Christianity: Though some sects believe in pre-determined salvation, many
consider evil the consequence of sinful acts and require repentance, confession, or
profession of faith to become “good” again.
(2) Judaism: The Law of Moses as described in the Torah defines how a person
becomes evil or “unclean” and the processes by which they can become good or
“clean” again. Each change of state requires participation in a rite or ritual.
(3) Hinduism: Evil actions attach Karma to one’s soul thereby affecting the status of
that person’s next incarnation. Eliminating Karma involves repetition of prayers,
good deeds, and other acts of devotion.
(4) Islam: Salvation and prosperity are considered rewards for faith and devotion.
This list is, by no means, exhaustive. However, these four religions represent some of the
wide diversity of religious people and show that the followers in each are responsible for
creating their evil state and for removing themselves from it. Therefore, a strictly
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religious perspective is likely to assume that a person has complete ability to influence
his/her state of evil and failure to become good is due to the individual’s choice.
However, religion is not the only factor that defines the sources of evil. Staub
(1999) brings evil back to psychology and examines the social, cultural, and personality
conditions that give rise to it. “Evil usually begins when profoundly important needs of
human beings are not fulfilled” (181). Bersoff (1999) and Tsang (2002) examine
situational factors that lead to the rationalization of, what they call, unethical behavior
and immoral behavior, respectively. Similarly, Moghaddam (2005), more specifically,
explores the “staircase” that leads to terrorism. While these articles do not deny
responsibility to the actor, they do imply a possible responsibility on the part of the
psychologist or society in general to recognize and eliminate the conditions that lead to
justification of evil actions. This is, to a large degree, a continuation of the discussion
began in Chapter 1. However, this adds the perspective of ability to influence the state of
being evil.
This discussion shows that there is some possibility that an evil state is only
partially subject to influence from the individual. If a state of being is brought about
through social or environmental conditioning, it stands to reason that transforming that
state is also greatly influenced by a change of the social or environmental conditions.
Therefore, there may be room for debate as to which argument receives the AGENT
thematic role in a sentence like John is evil. Religion would likely say that John is the
AGENT. Psychology opens the possibility that John is not the AGENT.
In the case of sick, there is also a lot of variation as to defining responsibility.
Klein (1999) characterizes one view by stating, “Because the sick person has
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involuntarily impaired functioning, it is only reasonable to exempt him from normal
responsibilities” (421). If the sick person is exempt from responsibility from his/her state
of being sick, it is reasonable to assume that the individual has little influence to affect or
change that state. Bringing about a change of state in terms of sickness is generally the
responsibility of the doctor.
However, the individual is able to influence his/her state to the degree that he/she
complies with a doctor’s recommendations. Scheurich (2002) points out that the behavior
of doctors toward their patients reflects whether or not the doctors feel that the patients
are complicit in their illnesses. That is, the curative process for some disorders requires
that the patients participate. When the patients do nothing, the doctors are frustrated and
consider them “difficult patients.” So, John may have different degrees of responsibility
in sentences such as John is addicted and John is schizophrenic and, therefore, the role of
AGENT becomes difficult to assign, and may likely be assigned to an argument external to
the sentence. This becomes especially true when the role of the psychologist is defined as
that of a counselor giving “support, consolation, suggestion, persuasion, and advice”
(Schachter and Kachele 2007:437), rather than the more traditional “healer,” which
places the majority of the responsibility on the doctor for bringing about a cure.
The justice system also contributes to our understanding of role assignment in this
area by determining a defendant’s degree of responsibility for criminal actions and
assigning “guilt”, “innocence”, or “insanity” (with varying degrees of severity) (Ferrell
1992). However, the same difficulty faced by psychologists in defining who is
sick/insane applies to the legal system making it increasingly difficult to establish clear
guidelines for determining responsibility (Finkle and Slobogin 1995, Tolmie 2001).
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There also seems to be a tendency for increased medicalization of criminal activity
(Wellman 2000, Albee 1997) making it that much more difficult to assign responsibility
due to the paradigm shifts that such medicalization elicits.
This discussion shows that the ability that a person has to influence a state of
being evil or sick is not clear. While it is likely that few people will claim that the sick
person is completely responsible for a state of being sick or for a change to a state of
wellness, it is also evident that there is not complete agreement that the sick person has
no responsibility for his/her state. Similarly, the evil person is unlikely to be completely
exonerated from being in a state of evil and is likely capable of significant influence over
a change of state. However, again, it is likely that total responsibility for change is
seldom assigned to the evil person when an appeal to the circumstances of life can be
made for shaping that person into his/her state.
In summary, there is support for the perspectives that a sick person has no
responsibility or partial responsibility for his/her state. There is also support for the
perspectives that the evil person has full responsibility or partial responsibility for his/her
state. This suggests that sick and evil do oppose each other with degrees of responsibility
making up a continuum between them. This view was tested using the empirical studied
described in Chapter 3. Several data gathering methods that inspired the construction of
the study are described in the next section.

2.6. DATA GATHERING. In gathering data, this thesis uses a combination of
approaches, the inspiration and justification for which are described in this section. The
method used to gather semantic data depends largely on how meaning is defined but does
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not always require the complexity of a formal theory. Meaning can be described simply:
the movie that plays in your head when you hear a word (Robertson 2005), for instance.
This statement harks back to Wittgenstein’s definition cited above: the meaning of a
word is its use in language. Similarly, Violi (2000) argues that meaning depends largely
on experience. The difficulty with these definitions of meaning is that they imply a
potential infinite amount of information in defining a word. For data to be meaningful it
must allow informants to include as much context, experience, and other contributing
factors as can be meaningfully processed (Wray et al. 2001).
It is impossible to process diverse data points which can be correlated in an
essentially infinite number of ways. Of course, there are methods that can be applied to
these definitions that avoid the complexity of infinite possibilities. Many researchers
gather a few instances of a word and compile a miniature corpus from which they extract
the apparent meaning of that word or the changes in meaning from one time to another.
Examples of this approach include:
(1) Citing single instances of several words that demonstrate the focus of the study –
Lehrer (1998) discusses a productive addition to the meaning of -ist/-ism
illustrated by the coinage of words such as speciesist, fossilism, auntism, etc.
These neologisms make up the corpus from which Lehrer draws conclusions.
(2) Citing multiple instances of a few words that demonstrate the focus of the study –
Shapiro and Shapiro (1993) discuss the inception of Wimp English,
communication in the service industry marked by exceptional hedging and the use
of the modal would, participial or deverbal adjectives, and the phrase if you will.
A corpus is generated from newspapers and third party conversations.
(3) Comparing word usage from two time periods – Hamp (1983) discusses the
amelioration of helluva drawing evidence from a corpus consisting of personal
conversation and the author’s recollection of the meaning in the 1930’s.
In each of these examples, the researcher gathers data to provide a very basic corpus. By
establishing a small body of evidence, the researchers are able to draw conclusions about
the words or aspects of words they are studying.
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The scope and complexity of the data gathering can be increased to strengthen
arguments for a particular semantic analysis. The following are examples of semantic
data-gathering methods with increased complexity:
(1) Combines survey with semantic features – Maxwell (1985) surveys residents
of several Mayan villages to collect numerous instances of illness words and
then again to determine the semantic features of those words.
(2) Combines corpus with semantic features – Cowie et al. (1999) compared
published lists of emotion terms against informant responses to generate a list
of common emotion terms and then tested subjects on the relevant features.
(3) Combines corpus with survey – Kiesling (2004) assigned his students to
gather instances of the word dude to compile a corpus. He then distributed a
questionnaire requesting information regarding the contexts in which an
individual would use dude.
In each of these examples, the researcher gathers data from informants in order to
determine meaning. Though the researchers do not specifically define meaning, the
methods of data gathering used in these examples suggest that they define meaning as
determined by usage and context. The articles cited in the above examples reach a
conclusion about meaning that pinpoints a specific aspect of that meaning. Naturally, it
would be tedious to expand a definition of a term to the complete list of its semantic
features. Instead, discussion focuses on only those aspects that are most relevant or
subject to variation from a standard.
This thesis is designed to investigate the hypothesis that sick and evil are partially
defined by how they assign the AGENT role, by their place on a continuum of
responsibility, and that demographic variation influences a person’s use of either sick or
evil. In order to proceed with the investigation, this thesis has targeted specific aspects of
meaning, namely: the thematic role of AGENT defined by the presence of the semantic
feature [+ RESPONSIBLE]. This focused definition of meaning allows a more focused
approach to data gathering. In order to gather appropriate data, this thesis makes use of a
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survey using a variety of questions and situations to test for the presence of the semantic
feature [+ RESPONSIBLE] in sick, evil and other related terms. This survey and method of
data collection used are described in Chapter 3. The results of the survey are discussed in
Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents the implications of the conclusions and presents limitations
and future work.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

3.1. INTRODUCTION. The previous chapters have described several of the
perspectives that have governed the historical perceptions of SICK and EVIL. They have
also reviewed a few theories and approaches to meaning. From the previous discussion
we might suppose that SICK and EVIL are differentiated from each other because evil
assigns an active/agentive thematic role, whereas, sick assigns a passive/patient thematic
role. The following sections describe a method whereby I evaluated the validity of this
claim.

3.2. HYPOTHESES. This methodology addressed the following null hypotheses:
(1) The modern conception and use of sick does not include the semantic feature
[-RESPONSIBLE],
(2) The modern conception and use of evil does not include the semantic feature
[+RESPONSIBLE],
(3) There is no continuum (overlap of referents) between the concepts of SICK and
EVIL

that are described as either sick or evil.

(4) People who work in the social sciences are not more likely than other
occupation groups to define criminal or immoral people as sick rather than
evil.

3.3. SUBJECTS. Individuals were invited to participate as survey subjects through a
network of colleagues, friends, associates, coworkers, etc. Invitations were distributed via
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email with a request to forward the invitations to people who might be interested.
Although this method of distribution cannot be considered absolutely random, it
presented several advantages over local distribution using hard copies. These include: (1)
increased variety of demographics including region, religion, and profession; (2) direct
transfer of data from survey to database for analysis; and (3) it allowed subjects to
respond at their convenience. However, there were a number of limitations inherent to
this method. These are acknowledged and discussed in Chapter 5.
All data gathered was from adults (persons older than 18 years of age). Also,
because of the interdisciplinary scope of this topic, effort was made to recruit subjects
from a range of professions and majors. The following demographic information was
collected: age, gender, occupation/field of study, and religion. No names were collected
to ensure anonymity. This information was used to address the fourth null hypothesis,
which treats the issue as to which term the social sciences are more likely to use.
Because of the wide diversity of the information reported by the respondents, it
was necessary to group the data into more general categories (e.g. secretaries were placed
in the ‘business’ group along with managers, consultants, and other occupations that
could be described as ‘business’). Age was not grouped but was analyzed by year as
reported by each participant. Occupation was divided into the following groups (with the
quantity in each group in parentheses): business (19), education (15), humanities (24),
medicine (13), social sciences (9), technical (17), and undeclared (9). Origin was grouped
by the following regions of the United States: West (11), Midwest (33), South (25),
Central (26), East (11). One respondent was from Canada, which was included in the
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Central region. Religion was divided into two groups: LDS (80) and non-LDS (26).
Figure 3.1 describes these groupings:
Demographic
Total
Gender

Group

1. Male
2. Female
Occupation
1. Business
2. Education
3. Humanities
4. Medicine
5. Social
Sciences
6. Technical
7. Undeclared
Origin
1. West
2. Midwest
3. South
4. Central
5. East
Religion
1. LDS
2. non-LDS
Figure 3.1. Demographic Groups.

Quantity
106
46
60
19
15
24
13
9
17
9
11
33
25
26
11
80
26

Due to the focus of this project on the semantic content of English words, all
processed data came from native English speakers. The possibilities of influence from
other cultures that have slightly different conceptions of evil and sick than would a typical
native English speaker (as noted by Levin and Rappport Hovav 2005:19) would extend
this research beyond its intended scope.

3.4. INSTRUMENTS. A survey was distributed consisting of four sections. These
sections were:
(1) Word Association – asked the subject to identify words associated with a
series of focus words.
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(2) Multiple Choice – asked the subject to answer questions by selecting from
among multiple options.
(3) Anecdotal Response – asked the subject to assign guilt based on anecdotes
from legal cases.
(4) Likert Scale – Subjects responded to prompts describing potentially sick or
evil behavior using a Likert Scale.
The following subsections of this chapter describe the survey in more detail with
examples to demonstrate the prompts used in the survey. The entire survey is available in
Appendix A.
All sections of the survey were reviewed and revised with the help of a focus
group. The focus group consisted of five BYU students. After establishing an initial draft
of the survey, it was distributed to the members of the focus group. After they responded
to all survey sections, I discussed problems, concerns, and confusions with each focus
group member individually. I then implemented changes based on these discussions.
Also, in order for the respondents to focus on specific terms, it was necessary in
designing the survey to establish and consistently use certain terms. For example, the
survey uses sick instead of ill or any alternative term because of its predominance in the
literature that inspired this study. Similarly, well was chosen instead of healthy. This
choice was made based on its relationship with good. Well can be seen as a counterpart of
good in that well is the opposite of sick in the same way good is the opposite of evil.
Although healthy is also the opposite of sick, it does not share the same close relationship
with good that well does.
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SURVEY SECTION ONE: WORD ASSOCIATION. This section of the survey was
intended to address the first two null hypotheses. By having the survey respondents
establish word associations between several lists of words, it should be possible to
determine how and if RESPONSIBILITY is related to SICK and EVIL.
The word association section of the survey consisted of two lists of words. The
first was a list of eight focus words. These words, in the order they were listed on the
survey, are: sick, insane, good, cure, evil, well, guilty, and redeem. Each of these focus
words headed a column that presented the second list of words. This second list is the
selection list and consists of words that were potential semantic features of the focus
words. All of the word lists used in this section of the survey were generated using the
Corpus of Contemporary American English created by Dr. Mark Davies. This Corpus is
available at www.americancorpus.org and contains over 385 million words from the past
two decades.
The list of focus words was selected from an electronic search for collocations of
sick and evil using the Corpus of Contemporary American English (Davies). The first one
hundred most frequent words resulting from this search were reviewed for relevance.
These were pared down by selecting those words associated with one of the search terms
(e.g. sick) that shared a counterpart word associated with the other search term (e.g. evil).
For example, since good is an antonym of evil, and well is an antonym of sick, both good
and well were selected as focus words. This process was repeated until there was a list of
fourteen of the most relevant words. These words were: evil, good, sick, well, insane,
wicked, virtuous, healthy, guilty, abnormal, cure, redeem, treat, and repent. This list was
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further reduced to eight using a focus group to eliminate the least relevant of the selected
terms. The terms removed were: wicked, virtuous, healthy, abnormal, treat, and repent.
The selection list consisted of the following words: addicted, atone, aware, care,
choice, criminal, cursed, drunk, heal, impair, inflict, innocent, intention, medicine,
penitent, recover, responsibility, soul, suffer, treatment. These words were selected by
using the focus words to search the Corpus of Contemporary American English (Davies)
for the most frequent collocations. The first ten results of each search were reviewed for
relevant words. Those that were determined to be relevant were reviewed by the focus
group and reduced to the twenty words listed above. The resulting word list is an attempt
to balance several words that are directly related to both sick and evil with a few, more
neutral, terms that still relate to the general genre so as to remain as a possibility for
selection. I have also included the word responsibility in the word list despite its absence
from any of the search results. It was necessary to include responsibility in the list as it is
intrinsic to the first and second hypotheses, which deal with [+/-RESPONSIBILITY] as a
potential semantic feature of sick and evil.
The intention here was to provide a variety of words that relate to the concepts of
SICK

and EVIL in order to explore the various facets of meaning in each of these concepts.

Using a variety of words, instead of just sick and evil, served two purposes: (1) the
generation of more data, so as to be able to draw sound conclusions; and (2) the ease of
discrepancy identification among the perceptions of the participants. The selection list
was provided to the subjects as potentially associated with each focus word. The subjects
were then asked to select the words from the selection list that they felt corresponded to
the focus word above each column. A response rate greater than 62 indicated a positive
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association. A response rate of less than 44 indicated a negative association. These
boundaries of significance are explained more in Chapter 4.
Four of the eight columns are presented in Example 3.1 below to demonstrate the
prompts used in the survey. The remaining columns are available in Appendix A.
Example 3.1
Please circle all the words in each column that you feel are
directly associated with the bold word above each list
Sick
Insane
Good
Cure
Addicted
Atone
Aware
Care
Choice
Criminal
Cursed
Drunk
Heal
Impair
Inflict
Innocent
Intention
Medicine
Penitent
Recover
Responsibility
Soul
Suffer
Treatment

Addicted
Atone
Aware
Care
Choice
Criminal
Cursed
Drunk
Heal
Impair
Inflict
Innocent
Intention
Medicine
Penitent
Recover
Responsibility
Soul
Suffer
Treatment

Addicted
Atone
Aware
Care
Choice
Criminal
Cursed
Drunk
Heal
Impair
Inflict
Innocent
Intention
Medicine
Penitent
Recover
Responsibility
Soul
Suffer
Treatment

Addicted
Atone
Aware
Care
Choice
Criminal
Cursed
Drunk
Heal
Impair
Inflict
Innocent
Intention
Medicine
Penitent
Recover
Responsibility
Soul
Suffer
Treatment

Care was taken in selecting these words to provide a variety of parts of speech
and to diminish ambiguity. For example, treatment was selected instead of its verb form
treat in order to reduce the possibility that a subject would interpret an alternative
meaning for treat, such as the noun that is synonymous with snack or candy and has no
apparent relationship to the concepts being considered in this study. Also, the focus

38
words were not included in the selection lists despite appearing at times as a most
frequent collocation in the corpus. These were rejected as part of the selection list in
order to maintain uniformity among the columns of selection words. This allowed the
respondents to select the corresponding words more quickly and avoided confusion that
would likely have emerged from inserting different words into each list.

SURVEY SECTION TWO: MULTIPLE CHOICE. The multiple choice section of the
survey consisted of direct questions regarding the subjects’ perceptions and usage of sick
and evil. This section was also directed at the first two null hypotheses. The difference
between the multiple choice section and the word association section is that the subjects
received greater context with the multiple choice questions. This section asked the
subjects to respond to ten multiple choice questions. No particular selection method was
used in determining these questions other than to ask questions that I felt specifically
addressed the issue of the relationships between RESPONSIBILITY, SICK, and EVIL. After
creating a number of multiple choice questions, these were reviewed by the focus group
and several were determined to be ineffective or confusing. The remaining ten were
included in the survey.
These questions focused on defining the difference between sick and evil with
multiple choice options selected to allow the subject to choose from among several
“typical” answers. In the event that a single answer did not allow the subject to
adequately express his/her perception of the concept in question, it was possible to select
as many answers as needed. Three of the questions dealt directly with the role of
responsibility and sick. Three of the questions dealt directly with the role of responsibility
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and evil. The remaining questions asked about how the two terms related to each other.
An example of the questions found in this section is:
Example 3.2:
Answer the following questions. Select ALL answers that you feel are
true. The use of “sick” or “ill” here refers specifically to mental illness.
The difference between “evil” and “sick” is:
a. choosing to bring about one’s state
b. accountability for the consequences of one’s actions
c. degree of responsibility
d. the difference is very slight, the words are almost synonymous
None of the questions were presented with an “opt-out” option, e.g. “other” or “none of
the above”, in the answer list. This forced the participants to choose from among the
answers listed and eliminated the need to guess at possible trends among slightly
different answers. This aspect of the methodology does have potential to skew the results
but is necessary for statistical analysis. This is addressed further in Chapter 5.

SURVEY SECTION THREE: ANECDOTAL RESPONSE. The third section of the survey
was intended to address the third null hypothesis that states that there is no overlap of
referent when using sick or evil. If it is possible to reject this hypothesis, there is support
to model the relationship between sick and evil as a continuum with varying degrees of
responsibility being assigned to the behavior in question.
This section of the survey consisted of five scenarios adapted from a legal study
by Finkel and Slobogin (1995). These scenarios were titled SMITH, JONES, JACOBS,
SORENSON, and DANIELS. All five scenarios deal with a form of intentional homicide,
which is generally considered an evil act. However, each scenario presented the
perpetrator as having some form of mental abnormality that may or may not affect their
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motivation, sense of reason, and accountability as seen in Example 3.3. All of the
scenarios came from actual court cases with the exception of DANIELS.
Example 3.3
Read the paragraph and answer the following questions.
1. Smith, a Vietnam veteran, who has a history of violent nightmares, and
who once fired an automatic weapon from the roof of his house with no
memory of the incident, shoots and kills his wife’s brother-in-law after his
wife left him a second time. The shooting occurred at midnight under
foggy, humid conditions reminiscent of Smith’s scouting days in Vietnam.
He claims that he believed he was cleaning out a Vietnamese hut, a claim
that was bolstered by expert testimony that he was suffering from posttraumatic stress syndrome.
Smith is:

a) not responsible for his actions.
b) partially responsible for his actions.
c) fully responsible for his actions.
d) fully responsible but justified in acting the way he did.

The five scenarios were selected to present a range of severity of mental disorder
and, subsequently, degree of culpability and accountability. Figure 3.2 presents each of
the scenarios, the medical diagnosis of the mental state, and the verdict or probable
verdict as presented by Finkel and Slobogin (1995).
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Scenario

Diagnosis

Verdict

SMITH

post-traumatic stress syndrome

Insane

JONES

not diagnosed

Insane

JACOBS

not diagnosed but history of
chronic depression,
suicidal/bizarre behavior, anger

Sane/guilty at trial;
insane at appellate trial

SORENSON battered woman syndrome,
learned helplessness

guilty of manslaughter
(similar cases yield
self-defense or insane
verdicts)

DANIELS

insane1

1

Schizophrenia

Probable verdict determined by expert consultation (Finkel and Slobogin, 1995: 425)

Figure 3.2. Culpability Scenarios.
The verdicts already show that there is variation in assignment of responsibility in court
cases. By including this section in the survey, I intended to verify the societal perspective
that responsibility for crime varies depending on the mental state of the defendant by
gathering data from a wider demographic than is found on a jury.

SURVEY SECTION FOUR: LIKERT SCALE. The fourth section of the survey was also
intended to address the third null hypothesis. This survey section presented sixteen
statements and asked subjects to identify their level of agreement with each statement
using a Likert scale. Like the third section, this section tried to present a variety of
situations to gauge what type of conditions encourage defining one situation as sick and
another as evil and where the two terms might overlap. The participant is asked to rank
the situation on a Likert Scale from 1 to 5 according to how sick (1) or evil (5) they feel it
is. An example of the type of statement found in this section is:

42
Example 3.4: Crimes committed when under the influence of doctor-prescribed
medication.
1
2
3
4
5
This list of behaviors and situations was generated through an effort to balance
two areas: law and religion. It was necessary to choose situations that would generate
consensus among the participants that the behavior in question is wrong. Therefore, I
reviewed the Ten Commandments and the Seven Deadly Sins in an attempt to establish
several ‘sins’ that should be consistent with the belief system of most English speakers
due to the language’s heavy Judeo-Christian influence. I also tried to use situations that
placed the ‘sin’ as a ‘crime’ so as to not alienate the non-religious. In total, I generated 20
prompts. With the help of the focus group, these were refined and several were
eliminated. This left a total of 16 prompts.

3.5. METHOD. The survey described above was distributed to subjects via an
online form and database application that allowed the subjects to enter their responses via
the internet. The responses were then stored directly in a database to be analyzed. The
URL to access the database was distributed through email. This method of data collection
allowed a much wider regional demographic and made it possible to solicit more
responses from more subjects since it did not require the subject to manage and return a
document to the investigator.
Data is presented in this thesis from 106 participants who accessed the surveys
between December 15, 2007 and January 15, 2008. However, the nature of the data
collection method is such that the data from many more subjects could be accommodated
and processed in a future study. No attempt was made to randomize the data collection as
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there was no precedent set for randomization in the studies discussed in Chapter 2 on
which this method was based.
Because this methodology solicits responses from human subjects it required
approval from the Brigham Young University Internal Review Board. The letter of
approval is available as Appendix B. The results obtained from the survey are presented
and discussed in Chapter 4. The significances of these findings are discussed in Chapter 5
along with possibilities for future work and some limitations of the survey.
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS

4.1. INTRODUCTION. The results of the study described in the previous chapter are
presented below. This chapter consists of four sections. The first begins with a discussion
of the methods used to determine significance followed by the data gathered from the
first half of the survey. The second section presents the data gathered from the remaining
half of the survey and describes the statistical tests used in their analysis. The third
section presents the demographic information gathered and how it relates to the data
already presented. The final section presents a discussion of the conclusions that can be
drawn from the data.

4.2. DETERMINATION OF SIGNIFICANCE. In the word association and multiple
choice sections of the survey, significance is determined by a simple majority. This
means that 54 of the 106 respondents must have marked an answer to consider that
answer significant. To ensure a 95% degree of confidence that achieving a 50+%
response rate is not due to chance, an additional requirement was added that the response
rate exceed the upper boundary of a confidence interval. This increases the response rate
required of any particular answer, to be confidently considered significant, to 63. All
response rates that exceed 63 will be referred to as having a high confidence relationship.
The word association section also establishes, and makes use of, the lower
boundary of the 95% confidence interval. This boundary is 43 responses. Response rates
below this boundary will be viewed as having a high confidence inverse relationship
between the words they describe. However, for simplification, all response rates that
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exceed the lower boundary will be referred to as having a low confidence relationship.
This terminology allows greater contrast between the relationships that exceed the upper
boundary and those that exceed the lower boundary as each are determined to be highly
confident.
This leaves a range of response rates between 44 and 62 that indicate mid-range
confidence. In general, the answers that lie in this range may be discussed in terms of
trends or possible indicators but not in terms of confident significance.

SEMANTIC FEATURE ANALYSIS. The word association section of the survey was
intended to address the first two null hypotheses. These hypotheses require evaluation of
the semantic features of the focus words associated with either SICK or EVIL. Establishing
an association between the words in each list is an indication of the semantic features the
word from the focus list might bear. The task given to the respondent was to evaluate a
potential relationship between a given word and the individual words in the subsequent
word list. Figure 4.1 shows the number of responses of each term in relation to the focus
word.
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Addicted
Atone
Aware
Care
Choice
Criminal
Cursed
Drunk
Heal
Impair
Inflict
Innocent
Intention
Medicine
Penitent
Recover
Responsibility
Soul
Suffer
Treatment

Sick
51
2
3
39
4
30
21
31
69
45
34
7
3
88
2
74
2
6
79
87

Evil
49
13
14
1
46
82
70
32
2
31
62
4
52
1
4
2
20
40
70
2

Insane
24
2
9
10
5
47
37
9
12
67
28
15
10
41
4
18
14
16
70
52

Guilty
35
20
33
5
47
86
32
22
4
17
43
20
39
1
18
10
50
26
59
9

Well
1
22
30
64
33
0
0
0
67
1
2
32
11
45
13
62
28
26
3
43

Good
3
43
52
77
74
0
1
0
57
0
1
69
32
27
39
28
70
73
1
25

Cure
27
28
14
52
25
3
5
4
95
6
4
5
13
92
14
85
13
12
10
93

Redeem
3
98
27
50
50
3
4
3
65
3
4
31
25
4
52
54
41
81
17
25

Figure 4.1. Word association response rates; Significant answers are bolded (low
confidence numbers are italicized, high confidence numbers are underlined).
There are a number of significant and insignificant pairings apparent in Figure 4.1. The
pairs that exceeded the upper threshold of 63 are: sick-heal, sick-medicine, sick-recover,
sick-suffer, sick-treatment, evil-criminal, evil-cursed, evil-suffer, insane-impair, insanesuffer, guilty-criminal, well-care, well-heal, good-care, good-choice, good-innocent,
good-responsibility, good-soul, cure-heal, cure-medicine, cure-recover, cure-treatment,
redeem-atone, redeem-heal, and redeem-soul. These are summarized in Figure 4.2.
The pairs that received fewer responses than the low confidence boundary of 43
are: sick-atone, sick-aware, sick-care, sick-choice, sick-criminal, sick-cursed, sick-drunk,
sick-inflict, sick-innocent, sick-intention, sick-penitent, sick-responsibility, sick-soul, evilatone, evil-aware, evil-care, evil-drunk, evil-heal, evil-impair, evil-innocent, evilmedicine, evil-penitent, evil-recover, evil-responsibility, evil-soul, evil-treatment, insaneaddicted, insane-atone, insane-aware, insane-care, insane-choice, insane-cursed, insane-
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drunk, insane-heal, insane-inflict, insane-innocent, insane-intention, insane-medicine,
insane-penitent, insane-recover, insane-responsibility, insane-soul, guilty-addicted,
guilty-aware, guilty-atone, guilty-care, guilty-cursed, guilty-drunk, guilty-heal, guiltyimpair, guilty-inflict, guilty-innocent, guilty-intention, guilty-medicine, guilty-penitent,
guilty-recover, guilty-soul, guilty-treatment, well-addicted, well-atone, well-aware, wellchoice, well-criminal, well-cursed, well-drunk, well-impair, well-inflict, well-innocent,
well-intention, well-penitent, well-responsibility, well-soul, well-suffer, well-treatment,
good-addicted, good-atone, good-criminal, good-cursed, good-drunk, good-impair,
good-inflict, good-intention, good-medicine, good-penitent, good-recover, good-suffer,
good-treatment, cure-addicted, cure-atone, cure-aware, cure-choice, cure-criminal, curecursed, cure-drunk, cure-impair, cure-inflict, cure-innocent, cure-intention, curepenitent, cure-responsibility, cure-soul, cure-suffer, redeem-addicted, redeem-aware,
redeem-criminal, redeem-cursed, redeem-drunk, redeem-impair, redeem-inflict, redeeminnocent, redeem-intention, redeem-medicine, redeem-responsibility, redeem-suffer, and
redeem-treatment. These are also summarized in Figure 4.2.
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High Confidence
Heal, Medicine,
Recover, Suffer,
Treatment
Criminal, Cursed,
Suffer

Low Confidence
Sick
Atone, Aware, Care, Choice, Criminal, Cursed, Drunk,
Inflict, Innocent, Intention, Penitent, Responsibility,
Soul
Evil
Atone, Aware, Care, Drunk, Heal, Impair, Innocent,
Medicine, Penitent, Recover, Responsibility, Soul,
Treatment
Insane
Impair, Suffer
Addicted, Atone, Aware, Care, Choice, Cursed, Drunk,
Heal, Inflict, Innocent, Intention, Medicine, Penitent,
Recover, Responsibility, Soul
Guilty
Criminal
Addicted, Aware, Atone, Care, Cursed, Drunk, Heal,
Impair, Inflict, Innocent, Intention, Medicine, Penitent,
Recover, Soul, Treatment
Well
Care, Heal
Addicted, Atone, Aware, Choice, Criminal, Cursed,
Drunk, Impair, Inflict, Innocent, Intention, Penitent,
Responsibility, Soul, Suffer, Treatment
Good
Care, Choice,
Addicted, Atone, Criminal, Cursed, Drunk, Impair,
Innocent,
Inflict, Intention, Medicine, Penitent, Recover, Suffer,
Responsibility, Soul Treatment
Cure
Heal, Medicine,
Addicted, Atone, Aware, Choice, Criminal, Cursed,
Recover, Treatment Drunk, Impair, Inflict, Innocent, Intention, Penitent,
Responsibility, Soul, Suffer
Redeem
Atone, Heal, Soul
Addicted, Aware, Criminal, Cursed, Drunk, Impair,
Inflict, Innocent, Intention, Medicine, Responsibility,
Suffer, Treatment
Figure 4.2. Extreme Confidence Comparison.
It is apparent from the data that there are many more words from the selection list that
show a low confidence relationship with the focus words than there are words from the
selection list that show a high confidence relationship with the focus words. In fact, more
than half of the selection list has a low confidence relationship with the focus words for
each of the focus words. The least number of low confidence relationships for one word
was 13 (occurring 4 times) and the greatest number was 17 (occurring once). Conversely,
the greatest number of high confidence relationships for one word was 5 (occurring
twice) and the lowest was 1 (occurring once). There were no focus words that did not
show both a high and low confidence relationship with at least one word from the
selection list.
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The presence of a relationship in Figure 4.2 is an indication that the related word
is associated with the meaning of the head word in each row. In the case of a high
confidence relationship (listed in the second column of Figure 4.2), I propose that the
related word represents a positive semantic feature. This establishes the following
semantic features for each focus word:
Sick – [+HEAL], [+MEDICINE], [+RECOVER], [+SUFFER] and [+TREATMENT];
Evil – [+CRIMINAL], [+CURSED] and [+SUFFER];
Insane – [+IMPAIR] and [+SUFFER];
Guilty – [+CRIMINAL];
Well – [+CARE] and [+HEAL];
Good – [+CARE], [+CHOICE], [+INNOCENT], [+RESPONSIBILITY] and [+SOUL];
Cure – [+HEAL], [+MEDICINE], [+RECOVER] and [+TREATMENT];
Redeem – [+ATONE], [+HEAL] and [+SOUL].
In the case of a low confidence relationship (listed in the third column of Figure
4.2), I propose that the related word represents a negative semantic feature. This
establishes the following semantic features for each focus word:
Sick – [-ATONE], [-AWARE], [-CARE], [-CHOICE], [-CRIMINAL], [-CURSED],
[-DRUNK], [-INFLICT], [-INNOCENT], [-INTENTION], [-PENITENT],
[-RESPONSIBILITY] and [-SOUL];
Evil – [-ATONE], [-AWARE], [-CARE], [-DRUNK], [-HEAL], [-IMPAIR], [-INNOCENT],
[-MEDICINE], [-PENITENT], [-RECOVER], [-RESPONSIBILITY], [-SOUL] and
[-TREATMENT];
Insane – [-ADDICTED], [-ATONE], [-AWARE], [-CARE], [-CHOICE], [-CURSED],
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[-DRUNK], [-HEAL], [-INFLICT], [-INNOCENT], [-INTENTION], [-MEDICINE],
[-PENITENT], [-RECOVER], [-RESPONSIBILITY] and [-SOUL];
Guilty – [-ADDICTED], [-AWARE], [-ATONE], [-CARE], [-CURSED], [-DRUNK],
[-HEAL], [-IMPAIR], [-INFLICT], [-INNOCENT], [-INTENTION], [-MEDICINE],
[-PENITENT], [-RECOVER], [-SOUL] and [-TREATMENT];
Well – [-ADDICTED], [-ADDICTED], [-ATONE], [-AWARE], [-CHOICE], [-CRIMINAL],
[-CURSED], [-DRUNK], [-IMPAIR], [-INFLICT], [-INNOCENT], [-INTENTION],
[-PENITENT], [-RESPONSIBILITY], [-SOUL], [-SUFFER] and [-TREATMENT];
Good – [-ADDICTED], [-ATONE], [-CRIMINAL], [-CURSED], [-DRUNK], [-IMPAIR],
[-INFLICT], [-INTENTION], [-MEDICINE], [-PENITENT], [-RECOVER], [-SUFFER]
and [-TREATMENT];
Cure – [-ADDICTED], [-ATONE], [-AWARE], [-CHOICE], [-CRIMINAL], [-CURSED],
[-DRUNK], [-IMPAIR], [-INFLICT], [-INNOCENT], [-INTENTION], [-PENITENT],
[-RESPONSIBILITY], and [-SOUL];
Redeem – [-ADDICTED], [-AWARE], [-CRIMINAL], [-CURSED], [-DRUNK], [-IMPAIR],
[-INFLICT], [-INNOCENT], [-INTENTION], [-MEDICINE], [-RESPONSIBILITY],
[-SUFFER] and [-TREATMENT].
This thesis is particularly concerned with the proposed semantic feature
represented as [+/-RESPONSIBILITY]. To this end, three words from the selection list
relating to RESPONSIBILITY were thought to be of particular interest. These words are:
choice, intention, and responsibility. Figure 4.3 shows the relationships represented in the
data between these three words and each of the four focus words related to the concept
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SICK (sick,

insane, well, and cure) and the four focus words related to the concept EVIL

(evil, guilty, good, redeem):
High Confidence
Sick
Well
Insane
Cure
Evil
Good

Choice, Responsibility

Guilty

Low Confidence
Choice, Intention,
Responsibility
Choice, Intention,
Responsibility
Choice, Intention,
Responsibility
Choice, Intention,
Responsibility
Responsibility

Choice, Intention

Intention
Intention

Redeem

Mid-Range Confidence

Intention,
Responsibility
Figure 4.3. RESPONSIBILITY Relationships.

Choice, Responsibility
Choice

Figure 4.3 shows that each of the focus words associated with SICK (sick, insane, well,
and cure) show a low confidence relationship with all three of the words associated with
RESPONSIBILITY (choice,

intention, and responsibility). This indicates that there is good

reason to establish a [-RESPONSIBILITY] semantic feature with each of these four focus
words and especially with the general concept of SICK. Therefore, the first null
hypothesis, that the modern conception and use of sick does not include the semantic
feature [-RESPONSIBLE], should be rejected. In other words, it is likely that
[-RESPONSIBLE] is one of the semantic features of sick. The conclusion we can draw from
this, that the concept of SICK is related to the lack of RESPONSIBILITY, was an expected
outcome of this methodology.
However, the above chart also shows that the only high confidence relationship
that exists among the words associated with responsibility is seen with good. The other
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three focus words associated with EVIL (evil, guilty, and redeem) do not show any high
confidence relationship with RESPONSIBILITY. Conversely, there are low confidence
relationships between evil and responsibility, between guilty and intention, between good
and intention, and between redeem and intention and responsibility. Furthermore, there is
a mid-range confidence relationship demonstrated between evil and choice and intention,
between evil and choice and responsibility, and between redeem and choice. Therefore,
there is not sufficient significance among the words associated with EVIL to establish a
semantic feature of [+RESPONSIBILITY]. Nor is it possible to establish the opposing feature
[-RESPONSIBILITY]. This lack of significance does not allow the second null hypothesis,
that the modern conception and use of evil does not include the semantic feature
[+RESPONSIBLE], to be rejected.

MULTIPLE CHOICE ANALYSIS. The data gathered from the multiple choice section
of the survey also addresses the presence of [+/- RESPONSIBILITY] in sick and evil. Each
question with the corresponding answers and response rates is reproduced in Figure 4.4.
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Qty

Question

Qty

1. A person who has a mental disorder

Question
6. The difference between “evil” and “sick” is:

72

a. cannot help being sick

48

35

b. is most likely to be cured through a conscious choice

57

74

c. is most likely to be cured with the help of a doctor

64

37

d. is most likely to be cured through his/her own efforts

6

2. How can one prevent sickness?

a. choosing to bring about one’s state
b. accountability for the consequences of one’s
actions
c. degree of responsibility
d. the difference is very slight, the words are almost
synonymous
7. What type of behavior would you describe as evil?

12

a. follow a doctor’s advice

81

a. criminal behavior

15

b. exercise

76

b. moral sin

13

c. eat right

42

c. political scandal

63

14

d. the actions of an insane person

47

d. all of the above
e. none of the above … there is no way to definitively
keep from getting sick
3. An evil person

13

e. small offenses (to draw emphasis)

99

a. is someone who chooses to do wrong

22

a. criminal behavior

32

b. is a criminal

19

b. moral sin

8

c. usually has a mental disorder

5

c. political scandal

24

d. can usually also be described as “sick”

87

d. the actions of an insane person

4. How does one change their state from evil to good?

14

8.What type of behavior would you describe as sick?

92

a. only through conscious effort

28

b. only with the help of a loved one

38

e. small offenses (to draw emphasis)
9. Do you use the terms “sick” and “evil” (and their
synonyms) interchangeably?
a. Yes, when discussing severe criminal activity

64

c. by ceasing to do evil acts

15

b. Yes, when discussing moral sin

1

d. a change to “good” will eventually occur regardless

8

c. Yes, when discussing despotic political leaders

5. Can some people be labeled both “sick” and “evil?”

4

d. Yes, when discussing mental disorders

a. yes, but that is rare

39

e. Yes, when discussing things that I find repulsive

b. no, the nature of sickness is that a person is not
responsible for their condition, and responsibility is
necessary to be considered evil

45

f. No, the words should not be used interchangeably

c. yes, a drug addict is an example of this overlap

36

17
20

17
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d. yes, but when that happens, “sick” loses its normal
meaning and becomes more synonymous with “evil”

10. Do you use the phrase “sick and wrong?”
51

4
18

a. Yes, when something is both sick and wrong
b. Yes, by using synonyms I add emphasis to the
offensiveness of a thing
c. No, because I don’t like to be redundant
d. No, because the words can seldom be used to
describe the same thing.

Figure 4.4. Multiple Choice Response Rates.
The responses that exceeded the significant threshold of 63 are: question 1 – answers “a”
and “c”; question 2 – answer “d”; question 3 – answers “a” and “c”; question 4 – answers
“a” and “c”; question 5 – no significant answers; question 6 – answer “c”; question 7 –
answers “a” and “b”; question 8 – answer “d”; question 9 – no significant answers;
question 10 – no significant answers. Reducing the data from Figure 4.4 to those answers
that crossed the threshold of significance produces Figure 4.5.
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Question
1. A person who has a mental
disorder:

Significant Answers
a. cannot help being sick
c. is most likely to be cured with the help
of a doctor
d. all of the above (eat right, exercise,
follow a doctor’s advise)
a. is someone who chooses to do wrong
a. only through conscious effort
c. by ceasing to do evil acts

2. How can one prevent
sickness?
3. An evil person:
4. How does one change his/her
state from evil to good?
6. The difference between
c. degree of responsibility
“evil” and “sick” is:
7. What type of behavior would a. criminal behavior
you describe as “evil?”
b. moral sin
8. What type of behavior would
d. the actions of an insane person
you describe as “sick?”
Figure 4.5. Significant Multiple Choice Answers.

# of
responses
72
74
63
99
92
64
64
81
76
87

This chart above does not include questions 5, 9, and 10 because they did not yield any
significant response rates among their respective answers, however the very fact that
responses to these questions did not significantly polarize suggests a general resistance or
uncertainty about the combination of the concepts of SICK and EVIL.
The questions above can be divided into 3 groups: (1) questions that address
sickness, (2) questions that address evil, and (3) questions that address both. The first
group is comprised of questions 1, 2, and 8. The first question shows very strongly that
the respondents are not assigning responsibility for being sick to the sick person
(evidenced by the high frequency of respondents that chose answer “a”). Answer “c” also
shows that the curative process is directed by the doctor. The second question is
somewhat anomalous with the rest of the data because it assigns a degree of
responsibility to preventing illness. Question 8 verifies one of the fundamental
assumptions of this thesis; that insanity is viewed as a type of sickness. The second group
is composed of questions 3, 4, and 7, which ask specifically about evil. Question 3, in
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particular, shows an overwhelming percentage of people who associate individual choice
with evil as a label. Question 4 also indicates that a change in state from evil to good is
left to the will of the person. Question 7 defines evil as sin and illegal activity. The third
group is composed of question 6, which asks for a comparison of meaning between the
two terms with 60% of respondents choosing degree of responsibility as the point of
difference between the meanings of SICK and EVIL.
These data mostly support the previous determination that SICK is associated with
a lack of responsibility. However, they also support the proposal that EVIL is partly
defined by responsibility. This is contradictory to the previous determination that there is
no strong relationship between RESPONSIBILITY and EVIL. This indicates a distinction
between lexical-semantic classification and world knowledge. The association of
RESPONSIBILITY

and EVIL in the second section of the survey shows that society does see

a relationship between the two concepts. However, this relationship is not maintained on
a word association level.

4.3. ANOVA STATISTICAL TEST. The remaining two sections of the survey show
very little statistical significance as defined for the previous two survey sections.
However, unlike the previous survey sections, the questions were set up to allow a
comparison between all responses and therefore are subject to other tests of significance.
An Analysis of Variation (ANOVA) was run on each of these sections. This allows for
identification of the statistical variation and groupings that exist among the questions.
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ANECDOTAL RESPONSE ANALYSIS. The Anecdotal Response section of the survey
resulted in the data presented in Figure 4.6 below.

not responsible
partially
responsible
fully responsible
responsible but
justified

SORENSON

JONES

JACOBS

SMITH

DANIELS

Battered woman

Gov. paranoia

Policeman

Vietnam vet.

Schizophrenia

5 (5.3%)

8 (8.5%)

4 (4.2%)

19 (20.1%)

31 (32.9%)

33 (35.0%)
38 (40.3%)

34 (36.0%)
60 (63.6%)

37 (39.2%)
57 (60.4%)

59 (62.5%)
22 (23.3%)

48 (50.9%)
22 (23.3%)

29 (30.7%)

3 (3.2%)

7 (7.4%)

5 (5.3%)

4 (4.2%)

Figure 4.6. Anecdotal Responses.
Figure 4.6 shows that DANIELS, who had schizophrenia and murdered his mother, was
considered the most “not-responsible.” JONES, who suffered from paranoia and shot
down a plane, killing the pilot, was assigned the greatest amount of full responsibility,
but was followed closely by JACOBS, a cop who killed a suspect for no apparent reason.
SORENSON, a battered woman who killed her husband, stands out from the other
scenarios by receiving 29 points of “responsible but justified” while all other scenarios
were assigned a single digit amount of points in this category. SMITH, who suffered
from post-traumatic stress syndrome and killed his brother-in-law, received the most
points in the “partially responsible” category. For convenience in comparing the raw data,
I have transferred it to the graph in Figure 4.7.

Figure 4.7. Anecdotal Data Graph.
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An initial look at the data shows that there is a strong indication that SMITH was
mostly viewed as only partially responsible for his actions (62.5%). JONES and JACOBS
were judged as being fully responsible (63.6% and 60.4% respectively). SORENSON and
DANIELS do not show as strong an indication for any particular judgment. However,
SORENSON is leaning mostly toward fully responsible (40.3%). SORENSON’s
responsibility is compounded by the possibility of adding the responses of ‘fully
responsible’ and ‘responsible but justified’ together. This would seem logical since
justification for action does not reduce the level of responsibility for that action. In fact,
the ‘responsible but justified’ response was included as an option so that the respondents
would not reanalyze justification as non-responsibility and falsely skew the data. This
would increase SORENSON’s ‘responsible’ response rate to 67 or 71.0%. Finally,
DANIELS tends toward the lack of responsibility for his actions showing the highest
scores among ‘not responsible’ (32.9%) and ‘partially responsible’ (50.9%).
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was run to determine whether the
respondents were more likely to judge the actor in one scernairo as more responsible for
the crime than another. The dependent variable was each respondent’s score for each of
the 5 scenarios. This ANOVA revealed a significant effect of scenario (F (4, 105) =
24.16, p < .0001). Further post hoc analyses revealed that the scenarios SMITH and
DANIELS were grouped together and were assigned the least responsibility, JONES and
JACOBS were grouped together and assigned greater responsibility than SMITH and
DANIELS, and SORENSON was ranked as having the greatest responsibility. A
comparison of this results to the actual outcomes of these cases, reported by Finkel and
Slobogin (1995) and discussed in Chapter 3, shows that our conceptions of responsibility
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do align, but only roughly, with the definitions of guilt, innocence and insanity as
determined by the legal system. This comparison is presented in Figure 4.8.
Scenario

Actual Verdict

Survey Determination

SORENSON guilty of manslaughter (though
Battered wife
similar cases often yield selfdefense or insane verdicts)

high responsibility

JONES

Insane

medium responsibility

sane/guilty at trial;
insane at appellate trial

medium responsibility

Policeman

SMITH

Insane

least responsibility

insane1

least responsibility

Gov. paranoia

JACOBS

Vietnam vet.

DANIELS
Schizophrenia
1

Probable verdict determined by expert consultation (Finkel and Slobogin, 1995: 425)

Figure 4.8. Scenarios Compared with Results.
The lowest tier of responsibility, as defined by the ANOVA and containing the
SMITH (Vietnam vet who killed his brother-in-law) and DANIELS (schizophrenic who
killed his mother) scenarios, shows a similar determination to the actual trial verdict of
insane. Being in the first tier of the ANOVA indicates the least responsibility for a crime,
as does a verdict of insane. The second tier of responsibility, consisting of JONES
(paranoia sufferer who kills airplane pilot) and JACOBS (policeman who kills suspect),
is an indication of indeterminate responsibility. The corresponding verdict would be
vacillation between guilty and insane, which is seen with the two outcomes of JACOBS.
JONES does not show this indecision and, unfortunately, there is no data presented to
indicate the presence of such indecision in the actual jury deliberation. The ANOVA’s
third tier of responsibility, consisting of SORENSON (battered woman who kills
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husband), is an indication of full responsibility and would correspond to a guilty verdict.
In the actual trial, SORENSON, was found guilty of manslaughter.
Inasmuch as SICK and EVIL are determined by degree of responsibility, the data
presented here show that the modern conceptions of these terms correspond well with the
legal definitions of GUILT and INSANITY. Because of the strong relationship between lack
of RESPONSIBILITY and SICKNESS demonstrated in the previous sections of the survey, it is
probable that there is a strong relationship between the societal conception of INSANITY
and the legal conception of INSANITY. However, because the relationship between
RESPONSIBILITY

and EVIL are less well defined, it is difficult to make the determination

that society models its definition of EVIL after the legal definition of GUILT, or vice versa.
Furthermore, because there was no concrete determination of association between
RESPONSIBILITY

and EVIL, it is impossible to establish that the scenarios that were

attributed full responsibility are evil. However, the established association between NONRESPONSIBILITY

and SICK does allows us to establish that the least responsible scenarios

were the most sick. Unfortunately, there is insufficient information to reject the third null
hypothesis, which states that there is no overlap of referents that are described as either
sick or evil. Had we been able to establish the expected association between
RESPONSIBILITY

and EVIL, it would be possible to reject this hypothesis based on the

intermediate grouping of scenarios with partial responsibility.

LIKERT SCALE ANALYSIS. The data gathered from the Likert Scale section of the
survey is presented in Figure 4.9 below. The table shows each prompt as it was presented
in the survey with the total rankings selected by the participants. The table also includes
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the number of abstentions that were collected for each prompt. Although the abstentions
were not included in the statistical analysis, I have left them here as part of the data and
will address them in Chapter 5.
Abstain
1. The actions of Adolf Hitler with regard to his
treatment of Jews and other non-Aryan ethnic
groups:
2. Failure to intervene in the commission of a crime
when there is little danger to oneself:
3. A schizophrenic person who frequently steals
from stores that he claims “owe him”:
4. Crimes of passion:
5. An unpopular boy who becomes a bully so others
will think he is “cool”:
6. A wealthy person who steals for the thrill:
7. An intoxicated person who accidentally kills
someone while driving:
8. A person with a social anxiety disorder who
refuses to help even when it means saving a person’s
life with minimal effort:
9. Crimes committed when under the influence of
doctor-prescribed medication:
10. Racism
11. A drug addict who steals in order to buy more
drugs:
12. Politically motivated genocide:
13. A head of household who is depressed and
refuses to find work to support his/her family:
14. A person’s failure to exercise even though their
obesity is causing them serious health risks:
15. Addiction:
16. A person who brags constantly about
accomplishments in order to win social acceptance:

Sick

Part
Sick

Half

Part
Evil

Evil

2

1

2

8

26

67

14

4

5

23

12

48

1
4

62
1

28
14

11
26

3
32

1
29

5
3

11
7

12
13

25
7

25
23

28
53

8

21

16

25

14

22

5

46

30

15

8

2

6
5

28
0

33
2

27
7

8
24

4
68

6
2

9
0

23
0

25
3

25
11

18
90

3

36

30

23

11

3

11
8

37
25

27
25

21
40

8
5

2
3

10

17

26

31

16

6

Figure 4.9. Likert Scale Data.
Figure 4.9 reflects a varied distribution of how society views different types of criminal
activity. While no items shows complete unanimity in response rates, i.e. no item shows a
100% response rate in any particular category, items 10 (racism) and 12 (genocide) both
show zero response rates in the “sick” category and item 12 also shows a zero response
rate for “partially sick”. Conversely, no item shows a zero response rate for “evil”,
although there are several items that are very close. These are items 3 (schizophrenic
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theft), 8 (fear of saving life), 9 (prescribed medication crimes), 13 (depression induced
selfishness), 14 (laziness), 15 (addiction), and 16 (bragging). The rest of the items are
best discussed in terms of their statistical groupings.
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was run to determine whether the
respondents were more likely to judge the actor in one scenario as more evil than another.
The dependent variable was each respondent’s score for each of the 16 scenarios. This
ANOVA revealed a significant effect of scenario (F (15, 105) = 86.158, p < .0001).
Further post hoc analyses revealed that the scenarios were grouped into six tiers. This
grouping moves from most sick to most evil. The first tier (most sick) consists of items 3,
8, and 14. The second tier consists of 9, 13, and 15. The third tier consists of 7, 11, and
16. The fourth tier consists of 4 and 5. The fifth tier consists of 1, 2, and 6. The final tier
(most evil) consists of 10 and 12. These groups are described in Figure 4.10 in order from
least (most sick) to greatest (most evil):
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Most sick 3. A schizophrenic person who frequently steals from stores that he claims
“owe him”
|
8. A person with a social anxiety disorder who refuses to help even when
|
it means saving a person’s life with minimal effort
|
14. A person’s failure to exercise even though their obesity is causing
|
them serious health risks
|
9. Crimes committed when under the influence of doctor-prescribed
|
medication
|
13. A head of household who is depressed and refuses to find work to
|
support his/her family
|
15. Addiction
|
7. An intoxicated person who accidentally kills someone while driving
|
11. A drug addict who steals in order to buy more drugs
|
16. A person who brags constantly about accomplishments in order to win
|
social acceptance
|
4. Crimes of passion
|
5. An unpopular boy who becomes a bully so others will think he is
|
“cool”
|
|
1. The actions of Adolf Hitler with regard to his treatment of Jews and
|
other non-Aryan ethnic groups
|
2. Failure to intervene in the commission of a crime when there is little
|
danger to oneself
|
6. A wealthy person who steals for the thrill
|
10. Racism
Most evil 12. Politically motivated genocide
Figure 4.10. Likert Scale Significant Groupings.
This table shows that items 3 (schizophrenia), 8 (social anxiety disorder), and 14
(obesity) are the most sick of the items presented in this section while items 10 (racism)
and 12 (genocide) are the most evil. All other items fall somewhere in between these two
designations.
Figure 4.10 shows that the determination of ‘most evil’ or ‘most sick’ is not easily
established because most of the items show a great deal of vacillation between whether it
is evil or sick. The fact that there are six tiers along the continuum demonstrates that there
is an overlap between referents labeled sick and referents labeled evil. Therefore, there is
reason to reject the third null hypothesis that claims such an overlap does not exist.
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4.4. DEMOGRAPHICS. Several types of demographic information were collected to
be able to make a determination as to the environmental influences that may be
associated with assigning responsibility to sick or evil. A step-wise multiple regression
analysis was used to identify potential demographic predictors. The demographic data
was only compared to the last two sections of the survey. The first two sections were not
included because grouping the data for analysis would only show the variation in number
of responses between demographic groups but would not associate those responses with
any particular word or prompt. This information would contribute little to the interests of
this thesis.
In the third section of the survey, occupation appeared as a predictor in all
situations and, in the case of DANIELS, accounted for 87% of the variation in participant
response. Origin appeared along with occupation as a co-predictor for SORENSON in
this section. None of the other demographic data showed any predictive potential. Figure
4.11 gives the predictor, associated R-square value (a determination of correlation), and
percentage for each of the scenarios in the third section of the survey:
SORENSON
JONES
predictor(s) a) occupation occupation
b) origin
r-square
a) .366
.205
b) .422
%
a) 37
21
b) 42
Figure 4.11. Anecdotal Section Predictors.

JACOBS
SMITH
DANIELS
occupation occupation occupation
.215

.339

.865

22

34

87

Because occupation was such a prominent predictor among these scenarios, an
ANOVA was run to identify the occupations that corresponded to declarations of lesser
and greater responsibility for a crime. These results are shown in Figure 4.12.
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f-statistic
p value
upper
boundary
predictors
lower
boundary
predictors

SORENSON
23.644
<.001
undeclared
business
humanities

JONES
5.075
<.001
undeclared
Technical

JACOBS
5.828
<.001
undeclared
socialscience
business
education
humanities

business
education
humanities
socialscience
medicine
Figure 4.12. Results of ANOVA for Occupation.

SMITH
11.567
<.001
undeclared

DANIELS
196.725
<.001
undeclared

business
business
education education
humanities
medicine

The results of the ANOVA showed that those who work in business, education, and the
humanities are the least likely to assign responsibility while those in the “undeclared”
group (consisting of those who did not declare an occupation and housewives) are most
likely to assign responsibility. Those who work in the social sciences show the greatest
variation and move at times from the lower boundary to the upper boundary, but are
mostly in the intermediate groupings as defined by the ANOVA. Therefore, it appears
that those who work in the social sciences are not more likely to assign sick rather than
evil as a label for behavior and we cannot reject the fourth null hypothesis.
The fourth section of the survey showed very low percentage predictors. The
more prominent predictors for individual prompts are displayed in Figure 4.13.
Most sick-----------------------------------------------------------most evil
laziness depression addiction bragging bullying pleasure racism
theft
predictor(s) occup. occup.
occup.
a)occup. occup.
occup.
age
b)origin
r-square
.188
.132
.102
a).875
.079
.092
.075
b).889
%
19
13
10
a)88
8
9
8
b)89
Figure 4.13. Likert Scale Section Predictors.
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While occupation was still listed as a predictor in many situations (except racism), it did
not account for as high a level of variation as seen previously except in the case of
bragging. Age resulted as a predictor of racism and origin demonstrated a high r-square
value with occupation as predictors of bragging.
Because occupation proved to be a very salient predictor in the case of bragging,
an ANOVA was run to determine which occupations accounted for the variation. As seen
previously, education made up the lower boundary and ‘undeclared’ the upper boundary.
All other occupations were listed in the middle tiers. I did not run an ANOVA on origin
despite its high r-square value with bragging because it only stood out as a predictor in
this one situation.
While occupation is pervasive among the data as a predictor, it lacks a high
degree of significance for much of the variation it predicts. Furthermore, the greatest
upper level correlations are seen in the category of ‘unknown,’ which is not especially
telling with respect to those occupations that work with sick and evil behavior. The lower
boundary correlations showed dominance with business and education. The cases where
the social sciences emerged as predictors contradicted each other in terms of indicating a
trend or drawing a general conclusion. There is very little support for rejecting the fourth
null hypothesis: those who work in the social sciences are not more likely than other
occupation groups to define criminal or immoral people as sick rather than evil.

4.5. DISCUSSION. The following discussion is intended to give further insight into
the possible significance of the data presented above. The discussion begins with the
apparent conclusions that can be made concerning the assignment of semantic features.
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This is followed by some expanded details of the characteristics that lead to a judgment
of sick and evil.

RELATIONSHIPS OF SEMANTIC FEATURES. The data presented above show very
strongly that there is little reason to associate RESPONSIBILITY with SICKNESS, but instead
rather strong reasons to associate NON-RESPONSIBILITY with SICKNESS. Conversely there
are strong reasons to associate RESPONSIBILITY with NON-SICKNESS (i.e. WELLNESS) due to
the fact that there was a high incidence of answers that indicated that a person could take
action to prevent sickness and higher than expected association of choice and
responsibility to well, despite the fact that the majority of respondents showed that there
is very little connection between RESPONSIBILITY and SICKNESS. These results suggest an
unexpected but theoretically interesting contribution of negative or null semantic
features, rather than positive features, to the meaning of SICK.
On the other hand, the study detected no significant correspondence, at the wordassociation level between RESPONSIBILITY and EVIL. Moving beyond word association to
direct questioning, however, many respondents made a connection between these two
concepts in the second section of the survey. Also, the data in Figure 4.14 shows that
there is a trend to associate responsibility with evil even if the data did not meet the
established level of significance.
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Figure 4.14. Graph of Word Associations. Red lines indicate boundaries of significance.
The above graph shows that, while significance was not universally attained among the
words associated with EVIL, there is still much greater association of responsibility,
intention, and choice to the EVIL focus words (last four groups of columns) than to the
SICK

focus words (first four groups of columns). The only exception is that evil shows

fewer occurrences of responsibility than does well, but this is in keeping with the earlier
observation that RESPONSIBILITY is a positive feature associated with NON-SICK or
WELLNESS,

while neither RESPONSIBILITY nor NON-RESPONSIBILITY is associated with EVIL

at the word level. Furthermore, if we limit the comparison to like terms (compare evil to
sick, guilty to insane, good to well, and redeem to cure) evil shows much greater
frequency with all responsibility-associated terms than does sick, and meanwhile good
shows much greater frequency with all responsibility-associated terms than does well.
Therefore, although we find that well has a higher frequency of responsibility association
than evil, this is merely in keeping with the theory that RESPONSIBILITY is a positivefeature marking on the word well, as well as the word good, but only a null or neutral
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semantic feature of the word evil. The weak but consistent trend shown in Figure 4.14
may be an indication that the threshold of confident significance was set too high.

JUDGMENT MODELING. The three potential models described in this thesis that
make definitions of evil and sick are based on psychology, religion, and law. The data
from the Anecdotal Response section of the survey showed that societal perceptions
regarding assigning responsibility reflect a legal definition of guilt and innocence.
The Likert Scale section of the survey showed many levels within each definition
establishing a continuum of increasing evil with decreasing sickness. That is, those items
that were assigned the most instances of evil (as opposed to mostly evil, equally evil and
sick, mostly sick, and sick) appear first and move across the graph as fewer and fewer
instances of evil were assigned. This is demonstrated in Figure 4.15.
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Figure 4.15. Likert Scale Line Graph. Showing items in order of descending evil.
This graph indicates that there is an inversely proportional relationship between
evil and sick. Both sick and mostly sick increase as evil decreases. This, again, is reflected
in the legal definitions of guilt and insanity. Though each verdict opposes the other in
terms of assigning culpability or responsibility for one’s actions, there is great variability
in how to define a crime, i.e. first degree murder involves premeditation and a high
degree of intention while manslaughter is usually accidental and due to recklessness
without the intention to kill.
However, even within the continuum between evil and sick there is some
indication that each level is defined by specific indicators. In order to compare the items
from the fourth section of the survey, I have arranged them into the groups defined by the
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ANOVA and dissected the prompts to describe the features of each. These are presented
in Figure 4.16.
Item Substance Social
Professional Mental
Crime
Abuse
Pressure Diagnosis
Disorder
Group 3
+
+
Theft
I
8
+
+
good
(most
Samaritan
sick)
14
Group 9
+
Crime
II
13
+
15
+
Group 7
+
DUI/
III
manslaughter
11
+
Theft
16
Group 4
IV
5
Group 1
V
2

+
Crime
+

6
Group 10
VI
12
(most
evil)
Figure 4.16. Features of Significant Groups.

Genocide
good
Samaritan
Theft
Genocide

Sin
theft
omission
sloth
crime
sloth
gluttony
not kill
theft/
gluttony
pride
crime
envy
not kill
omission
theft
pride
not kill

Figure 4.16 shows that every item involves a sin, as it is usually defined by
religion, and most involve a crime, as it is usually defined by law. Group I (most sick) is
generally defined by diagnosed mental disorders. Groups II, III, and IV are defined by
external influences (substance abuse and social pressure). Groups V and VI (most evil)
are defined by the distinct lack of mitigating factors that negate responsibility. That is,
when external influences (e.g. substance abuse, peer pressure, etc.) are not associated
with the activities listed above, there is a clear determination that the activity is evil. This
gives some indication of a trend that shows the reduction of severity of external
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influences as the chart moves from sick to evil. A diagnosed mental illness, being the
most severe type of influence, is defined as sick. Substance abuse and social pressure,
which are less severe types of influence than mental illness, are defined as partially evil
and partially sick. Finally, those actions that experienced no external influence were
defined as evil. Despite this trend that associates decreasing influence with increasing
evil, there are also some exceptions to these general indicators. Of particular note is
number 13 (depression induced laziness), which is considered somewhat less sick than
number 14 (laziness despite health risk) but has a mental disorder to motivate the
associated sin (sloth). Number 14, also guilty of sloth, has no associated influence to
motivate the sin, but is still grouped in the most sick category.
Despite these similarities to the legal model, where degree of responsibility
roughly indicates level of legal sanction, there is no indication, demographically, that the
responses indicate competition between psychological and religious models. Because
psychology works to cure sick people and religion works to cure evil people, one might
expect a psychological model to redefine the survey responses to show greater instances
of sick and a religious model to show greater instances of evil; however, there is no
indication from the survey that this is the case. The respondents from the social sciences
did not show greater tendency toward use of sick. Also, religious background was
associated with no significant variation (although, the responses were grouped to show
variation among religions rather than between the religious and non-religious). Therefore,
this study does not rule out the possibility that there is little variation between how
professionals view these concepts. Groups may therefore share the same conceptual
models and only differ in how they approach treatment and healing.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
5.1. INTRODUCTION. This thesis has proposed a contrastive analysis of the
concepts of SICK and EVIL based on relative degree of agency. However, the basic
assumption that responsibility is the dividing force between these concepts was only
partially supported by the data collected. This chapter will explore the conclusions to be
drawn from these results, discuss implications and propose additional work to be done to
improve these conclusions.

5.2. SUMMARY. This study shows that the shift from the historical to modern
perceptions of SICK and EVIL reflects a shift in the assignment of responsibility, though
perhaps not to the degree expected. Historically, it was very common for the person who
experienced a change of state from healthy to sick to be held accountable, but there is
now a public perception that places very little responsibility on the subject of the
predicate sick. Returning to the discussion of Thematic Roles, this shift of responsibility
assignment is an indication that the AGENT role is now most commonly assigned to an
external argument (i.e. not the subject of the sentence) when dealing with a change of
state to sick. The examples cited in this thesis show agency assigned to the person that
undergoes the change of state, to cosmic forces, to rival tribes, and to angry spirits. Each
of these entities removes some degree of responsibility from the person suffering from
sickness. The perception of physical illness has developed along with germ theory to the
extent that the AGENT role may not even be assignable since the causative entity lacks
volition, animacy, and possibly other features that define agency or responsibility.
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In the case of mental illness, causation is often more difficult to determine.
However, the survey data indicates that assignment of responsibility to a person for a
state of mental illness is no more likely than assignment of responsibility for physical
illness. As this study demonstrates, there is very little responsibility that is associated
with sickness. Without the [+RESPONSIBILITY] feature to transfer to an argument (whether
present in the statement or not), sick may lack the AGENT role entirely.
Contrastively, despite the lack of association of responsibility with sickness
demonstrated in the survey, there does appear to be an indication that a person has some
responsibility for maintaining his/her health and affecting a cure for sickness. These
indications were not especially pronounced in the data, which may be a concession to the
fact that there is no volitional cause of illness. Though there are steps to take in the
prevention of illness, and adherence to medical advice is more likely to encourage
healing, the actual changes of state are not subject to an individual’s will.
In the case of EVIL, there has not been as dramatic a shift in responsibility
assignment as expected but there is an indication that [+RESPONSIBILITY] is associated
with evil. This indication is primarily pronounced in the Multiple Choice section of the
survey. It may not be as evident in the Word Association section of the survey due to
unanticipated pragmatic aspects of the terms responsibility, choice, and intention. These
terms were highly associated with good, but not with its antonym evil. This may indicate
that people view responsibility, choice, and intention in isolation as inherently good.
Without context, these terms may have an automatic association with common phrases
(e.g. good intentions), complements (i.e. to be responsible is good), or moral ideals (i.e.
the freedom to choose). This speculation may account for the disproportionate instances
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of the survey participants’ association of these three terms with good relative to the
instances of association with evil, guilty, and redeem.
However, the second section of the survey provided more context than the word
association section. This context was presented in the form of full questions with multiple
options, whereas, the word association section merely offered a list of words. The
resulting data from this method show that there is a stronger indication that the point of
divergence between SICK and EVIL is the feature [+/- RESPONSIBILITY] where EVIL bears
[+RESPONSIBILITY] and SICK bears [-RESPONSIBILITY]. The association of RESPONSIBILITY
with EVIL would have the effect of establishing the subject of evil as the causal AGENT of
the state of being EVIL. The person who undergoes a change of state to EVIL would also
be the force that motivates that change. Likewise, a change of state from EVIL to GOOD
would be left to the will of the person that experiences that change. Therefore, evil would
assign the AGENT role to the subject. However, the necessary association of
RESPONSIBILITY

with EVIL was not consistently manifested in the survey results and it

would be premature to draw this conclusion without further study.
This thesis has attempted to present a very polar distinction between EVIL and
SICK

in terms of agentive influences on changes of state. If a subject is assigned

responsibility for the state, then that subject is the AGENT. If there is no responsibility,
that subject is not the AGENT. I have further tried to establish that there is a continuum
that runs from EVIL to SICK in terms of assigning responsibility for actions. Aspects of
these hypotheses were supported by the data as there is an apparent continuum between
EVIL

and SICK. However, the EVIL end of this continuum appears to be less well defined.

That is, the association of NON-RESPONSIBILITY and SICK establishes one pole. The middle
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ground shows aspects of partial responsibility making it unclear as to whether something
is EVIL or SICK. However, that which is clearly defined as EVIL did not have as clear an
association of RESPONSIBILITY, but instead a negative association with NONRESPONSIBILITY,

which is a subtle but important distinction. A sick person is not

responsible, but an evil person is not so much responsible as NOT not-responsible.

5.3. IMPLICATIONS. One possibility that may address both the expected and
unexpected findings of the survey is to reconsider the model that places sick and evil at
polar ends of a continuum. By basing a new model on the survey findings of an
association between NON-RESPONSIBILITY/SICK and RESPONSIBILITY/GOOD and placing
those into the opposing diagonals of a Greimas Square to show their contradictory
relationship, we can draw out further contrasts and entailments. This is presented in
Figure 5.1:

Figure 5.1. Greimas Square I.
One line of contradiction (dotted) shows the associations established by the survey and
runs from responsible to ~responsible. These associations have been discussed already in
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this thesis. The lines of contrast (solid) require use of a term that has not been dealt with
in this thesis: irresponsible. While irresponsible is a likely opposite of responsible, it
does not necessarily imply a lack of responsibility for one’s actions (a preliminary
judgment of the meaning seems to indicate that irresponsibility implies a lack of
awareness or concern for the consequences of one’s actions). A criminal can act
irresponsibly and still be guilty of a crime. The main point of separation between
responsible and irresponsible is based in the morality of the action (whether it is good or
bad). Of course, there is an issue of markedness here that allows one to be responsible for
both actions that are morally good and morally bad, while irresponsible only associates
with moral badness. Considering this, the contrast described here gives a possible
explanation for the low association of responsibility with evil in the first section of the
survey followed by the high association of responsibility with evil in the second section.
However, verification of this requires the inclusion of irresponsibility in the survey.
The final node of the Greimas Square presents the possibility that there is an
association between well and ~irresponsible. The term ~irresponsible can be seen as
being the opposite of irresponsible. That is, as discussed above, if people are
irresponsible, they lack awareness of the consequences of their actions. Therefore, if
people are ~irresponsible, they do not lack this awareness of the consequences. However,
this still does not necessarily imply culpability. There is a distinction between being
responsible and being ~irresponsible that is best illustrated by analogy: if I leave my door
unlocked and am subsequently robbed, I cannot be held responsible for the burglary.
However, I did facilitate it through my negligence. Therefore, I am not responsible. I am
also not irresponsible or ~irresponsible.
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The possibility of an association between ~irresponsible and well is supported by
the findings that there is some indication that a person is able to maintain a healthy state
through his/her actions. However, this does not necessarily mean that a person is
responsible for such a healthy state. Instead, it alludes to the possibility that a person,
while not responsible for maintaining a state of wellness, is also ~irresponsible for
maintaining that state of wellness. In other words, no matter what steps a person takes to
prevent illness (exercise, diet, washing hands, etc.), that person will never be able to take
complete control over his/her health so as to deter all illness.
Expanding the square to include labels for the combinations of nodes yields
further evidence that this model has the potential to accurately describe the data gathered
in the survey by incorporating the legal associations discussed in Chapter 4. Figure 5.2
shows this expansion:

Figure 5.2. Expanded Greimas Square.
The combination of responsible (good) with irresponsible (evil) describes moral choice.
Both terms imply responsibility for actions but differ in aspect of morality (as discussed
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above). The combination of ~irresponsible (well) and ~responsible (sick) are similarly
juxtaposed but without the element of culpability and therefore describe goodness and
badness in terms of health. Innocence is described by combining responsible (good) with
~irresponsible (well) and the possibility of partial responsibility that has been discussed
at length in previous chapters is described by combining irresponsible (evil) with
~responsible (sick). Finally, guilt is described by the relationship between irresponsible
(evil) and ~irresponsible (well). This leaves one relationship not labeled, that of
responsible (good) and ~responsible (sick). To my knowledge, there is not any particular
determination for this state of being other than to say a person is good but sick or
something similar. If the proposed Greimas Square model can be shown to accurately
describe the relationships discussed in this thesis, it would be interesting to see if other
words used in this survey also display relationships accurately described by this model
(e.g. redeem and heal as they relate to sin, fall ill, etc.)
The previously discussed expansion of the Greimas Square brings the discussion
back to the legal world. We have seen how the public perception mimics the legal system
in terms of assigning responsibility to those who are guilty but not to those who are
insane. Therefore, guilty would carry the feature [+RESPONSIBLE] and insane would carry
[-RESPONSIBLE]. However, there is a third determination made by courts: innocence, or in
typical verdict parlance “not-guilty.” This determination would be the equivalent of good
the same way that guilty equates to evil. The interesting point here is that good/innocent
must also carry the feature [+RESPONSIBILITY] despite the fact that it is essentially a
determination of non-responsibility for a crime. Put more simply, to be innocent is to be
responsible for not committing a crime. While a verdict of guilty is a declaration of a
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state of responsibility for a crime, a verdict of not-guilty is a declaration of a state of
responsibility for not committing a crime. Committing a crime involves choice, intention,
volition, etc. Similarly, not committing a crime also involves choice, intention, volition,
etc. Conversely, a verdict of innocent by reason of insanity is a declaration of a state of
no responsibility for one’s actions. The defendant may have in fact committed a crime
but lacks the choice, intention, volition, etc. that define responsibility for the crime. This
is summarized by Figure 5.3:
Responsible
Guilty
X
Not-Guilty
X
Insane
Figure 5.3. Evaluation of legal verdicts.

Not Responsible

Good

Evil
X

X
X

This chart shows that the distinction between a verdict of guilt or innocence is the moral
value of the actions. However, because a verdict of insane does not carry responsibility,
the morality of the action is not a factor in its assignment.
This study further implies that [+RESPONSIBLE] is a summary of the various
features that define the role AGENT. Such elements as [+ANIMATE], [+CAUSE],
[+VOLITION], etc. that are often used to define the AGENT role may also be found as the
semantic features of responsibility. In other words, responsibility may be a synonym of
agency. However, verification of this claim would require additional research as its
validity is not demonstrated in this thesis.
This also leads to the possibility that there are varying degrees of responsibility
assigned to an AGENT thematic role. Similar to different definitions of the AGENT role,
responsibility may entail a variety of features depending on the context of its use. This is
shown to some degree in the lack of dominance of either evil or sick in the survey
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questions. However, in terms of evil alone, the task remains to identify other factors that
mitigate the level of responsibility assigned to such actions and how to classify those
factors (i.e. is submission to peer pressure a sickness or something else?).

5.4. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS. One observation that I made repeatedly as I
prepared and executed this study was the polysemous nature of sick. The discussion
within this thesis ranges from physical to mental infirmities (though the focus was on the
mental so as to contrast states of mind as there is no physical counterpart of evil).
However, the range of meanings of sick include many more variations from disgusting
(as mentioned previously) to perverted to a slang term for good. While this study has not
made an exhaustive analysis of the meanings of sick and evil, focusing instead on just the
aspect of responsibility, it seems apparent that the meaning of sick has generalized to the
point that precise interpretation of its use depends greatly on context. Evil, however,
seems to have remained fairly constant and more specific in meaning, relative to sick.
However, it is possible that evil will show much more variation in coming years with its
adoption by the political world, showing a spike in use since the 1990’s after consistently
diminishing in use since the 1950’s, according to the Time Magazine Corpus (Davies).
There is also an indication that concepts of NON-RESPONSIBILITY vs. NON-NONRESPONSIBILITY,

as associated with sick and evil may inform expert descriptions of the

relative characteristic behavior of social vs. psychological disorders. The survey data
showed that those items that used terms like schizophrenia, social anxiety disorder, on
one hand and genocide, or racism on the other hand were on the extremes of the
continuum between EVIL and SICK. Therefore, it may be that establishing the label
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schizophrenia carries with it the feature [+SICK] and establishing the label genocide
carries with it the feature [+EVIL]. Whereas terms that lie in the middle of the continuum,
like addict or bully, do not necessarily carry either semantic feature because there is not
consistent association of these terms with either of the polar concepts. Determining the
semantic features that these middle-laying terms do carry would be an interesting future
study.

SURVEY LIMITATIONS. The sections of the survey were chosen to be consistent
with the type of data collection used by other researchers, as discussed in Chapter 2, and
to present a wide array of information for analysis. It was hoped that breadth of variation
would add validity to the conclusions drawn from the data. However, the structure of the
survey sections led to other problems. Some of these issues are:
(1)

The first two sections (word association and multiple choice) presented
conflicting data with respect to whether [+RESPONSIBILITY] was
associated with evil.

(2)

The third section (anecdotal response) was flawed in that it required
rejection of the first two null hypotheses in order to establish the
anticipated continuum that would lead to the rejection of the third null
hypothesis. Because there was no established association between
[+RESPONSIBILITY] and evil, no conclusions could be drawn from this
section.

(3)

The data gathered from the multiple choice and anecdotal response
sections was difficult to process and interpret.
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(4)

The selection method used to generate questions and answer options
for the multiple choice section was very biased to my personal views
on the subject.

These points lead to the conclusion that the second and third sections (multiple choice
and anecdotal response) should be revised or removed from this survey in future
distributions. Each of these sections provided interesting insights that could inspire future
work if they are revised. However, removal of these sections would also allow the
researcher to increase the quantity of prompts in the word association and Likert Scale
sections. Increasing these sections could lead to increased confidence in the conclusions
already drawn and improve understanding of the processes used in determining agency
with respect to sick, evil and other associated terms that were not addressed in this study.
Another limitation of the survey is the failure to randomize the distribution. A
truly random distribution of the survey may have shown more demographic predictors
emerge from the data. As it was, several of the demographic groups had insufficient
numbers to show a statistically significant representation of that group. This is
particularly true for the social science professionals whose responses were of inherent
interest to this thesis. Also, a more representative and diverse grouping of the religious
demographic may have provided more interesting results since the ‘non-LDS’ group
included a variety of religions including atheism, Hinduism, and the Native-American
Church, and a variety of Christian religions.
Also, as stated in the methodology, the survey was structured to force the
participant to choose from among the options presented. This is necessary from a
statistical standpoint as it is impossible to analyze “write-in” answers in any meaningful
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way. However, it also allows only limited information to be gathered. Naturally, the
pursuit of truth beckons the contribution of all knowledge and by limiting the type of
answer that can be processed we can only hope to get somewhere near the truth. I bring
this up because the last section of the survey showed a lack of response from several of
the participants. While only one participant abstained from answering the entire section,
the number of abstentions varied with each question. The highest number of abstentions
was fourteen for the question dealing with a person who refuses to assist the victim of a
crime. It is impossible to definitively interpret the reason for these abstentions. However,
I speculate that many of them were motivated by a perception that the item was neither
sick nor evil.
Two of the participants sent me emails whose contents support this speculation.
One specifically pointed out that the participant did not believe that a person’s failure to
provide for his/her family was either evil or sick but that it was an act of selfishness and
this perception carried over to other items besides the one mentioned. From a personal
perspective, some (including the author) could respond by saying that selfishness is a
type of sin and therefore an act of evil. However, this participant obviously did not share
this view and our differing perceptions point out that some people may operate with a
more specialized meaning of evil than I have assumed in this thesis.
The second email pointed out that the survey did not take into account the variety
of Native American cultures that may perceive sick and evil as having no relationship and
therefore, the dichotomy tested in the survey is a false one. This is a valid criticism and
points out the very biased Christian slant of the survey (especially with many of the items
in the fourth section being based on the Ten Commandments and the Seven Deadly Sins).
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However, my response is that it is not a test of cultural perception but rather how those
perceptions are reflected in the English language. The English language has developed
the sick/evil relationship independently of the Native American cultures and languages
(though perhaps influenced by them). The sick/evil relationship also has close ties to the
Christian tradition because of the role of the Bible in English literacy. This study does not
stand or fall on the assumption that a non-English language would contain the same
relationships between words, especially when that relationship is so heavily couched in
religion, law, and psychology; fields that are heavily influenced by culture. However, any
further study that applies methods similar to those set out in this thesis to languages and
cultures ostensibly different from ours would likely reveal further interesting
comparisons and contrasts between the concepts of EVIL and SICK in other cultures.

FUTURE WORK. Several possibilities for future work have been mentioned
throughout this chapter. These include: verifying the potential of the Greimas Square as a
model for the sick/evil relationship and extending the focus of inquiry into
irresponsibility and other related terms, evaluating the connection between legal
terminology and the terms used in this thesis, investigating the sick/evil relationship in
other cultures and languages, etc. However, the possibilities for future work extend
beyond these and beyond linguistics. I have already suggested that the lack of a strong
linguistic connection between evil and responsibility may have been motivated by the
pragmatics of trying to associate a negative term (evil) with a positive feature
(responsibility). However, this also invites a sociological investigation into what the
disassociation of these two terms means for society. Does our world view beyond
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linguistic implication also disassociate the concepts? Is this an indication of failing
morality and/or ethics?
Also, this thesis has not attempted to participate in the debate on the usefulness of
EVIL

for clinical scientists despite the debate having inspired this thesis. However, the

conclusion that there is an overlap of behaviors labeled sick and behaviors labeled evil
may contribute something to the fields. For example, to overcome an addiction, 12-step
programs require effort from both the individual and the support group. This suggests that
an addict is both sick and evil since both the AGENT and PATIENT roles appear to be
assigned to the addict. Of course, verification of this proposal requires further research.
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY
CONSENT TO BE A RESEARCH SUBJECT
Introduction
This research study is being conducted by Nathan Simmons, a graduate student at
Brigham Young University, to determine the difference in meaning of the terms sick and
evil (and related terms) and what conditions determine use of each term in relation to the
other. You are being invited to participate in this study because, as a native English
speaker, you have an intuitive understanding of what these terms mean. It is the intention
of this study to define that intuitive understanding.
Procedures
You will be asked to complete a questionnaire. The questionnaire consists of five sections
with a total of 45 questions and will take approximately 20 minutes. The questions are
presented in a variety of formats asking you to indicate word associations, make
determinations as to guilt or innocence, and discuss your use of sick and evil and how you
perceive these terms. The survey also asks for a few demographics including age, gender,
origin, occupation, and religion.
Risks/Discomforts
There are minimal risks for participation in this study. However, you may feel emotional
discomfort when answering questions about personal beliefs or when making judgments
about guilt or innocence.
Benefits
There are no direct benefits to subjects. However, it is hoped that through your
participation researchers will learn more about how society defines mental illness and
guilt for criminal actions that may apply to psychological evaluations and legal
determinations.
Confidentiality
All information provided will remain confidential and will only be reported as group data
with no identifying information. All data, including your answers to the questionnaire,
will be stored in a password protected database with access granted only to the principal
investigator. After the research is completed, the data will be deleted.
Participation
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Participation in this research study is voluntary. You have the right to withdraw at
anytime or refuse to participate entirely without jeopardy to your class status, standing
with the university, or other social and professional relationships.
Questions about the Research
If you have questions regarding this study, you may contact Nathan Simmons at
(801)422-4414 or ngsimmons@byu.edu.
Questions about your Rights as Research Participants
If you have questions you do not feel comfortable asking the researcher, you may contact
Christopher Dromey, Ph.D, IRB Chair, 422-6461, 133 TLRB,
christopher_dromey@byu.edu.

I have read, understood, and received a copy of the above consent and desire of my own
free will to participate in this study.
Click the "I agree" box if you wish to participate; click the "I disagree" box if you
do not wish to participate:
I agree
I disagree

SECTION 1: DEMOGRAPHICS
This is the first of five sections. Each section presents a different style of question. Please
don't dwell on any particular question. First impressions are more likely to correctly
identify your intuitive responses.
After submitting your responses to each section, do not use the back button to go back
and change your answers. This will confuse the database interface.
Survey: Please answer the questions below
Age: _________
Gender: M / F
Occupation/Major:___________
Hometown:_________________
Religion:__________________
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SECTION 2: WORD ASSOCIATION
Please circle all the words in each column that you feel are directly associated with the
bold word above each list.
Sick

Good

Evil

Guilty

Addicted
Atone
Aware
Care
Choice
Criminal
Cursed
Drunk
Heal
Impair
Inflict
Innocent
Intention
Medicine
Penitent
Recover
Responsibility
Soul
Suffer
Treatment

Addicted
Atone
Aware
Care
Choice
Criminal
Cursed
Drunk
Heal
Impair
Inflict
Innocent
Intention
Medicine
Penitent
Recover
Responsibility
Soul
Suffer
Treatment

Addicted
Atone
Aware
Care
Choice
Criminal
Cursed
Drunk
Heal
Impair
Inflict
Innocent
Intention
Medicine
Penitent
Recover
Responsibility
Soul
Suffer
Treatment

Addicted
Atone
Aware
Care
Choice
Criminal
Cursed
Drunk
Heal
Impair
Inflict
Innocent
Intention
Medicine
Penitent
Recover
Responsibility
Soul
Suffer
Treatment

Insane

Cure

Well

Redeem

Addicted
Atone
Aware
Care
Choice
Criminal
Cursed
Drunk
Heal
Impair
Inflict
Innocent
Intention
Medicine
Penitent
Recover
Responsibility
Soul
Suffer
Treatment

Addicted
Atone
Aware
Care
Choice
Criminal
Cursed
Drunk
Heal
Impair
Inflict
Innocent
Intention
Medicine
Penitent
Recover
Responsibility
Soul
Suffer
Treatment

Addicted
Atone
Aware
Care
Choice
Criminal
Cursed
Drunk
Heal
Impair
Inflict
Innocent
Intention
Medicine
Penitent
Recover
Responsibility
Soul
Suffer
Treatment

Addicted
Atone
Aware
Care
Choice
Criminal
Cursed
Drunk
Heal
Impair
Inflict
Innocent
Intention
Medicine
Penitent
Recover
Responsibility
Soul
Suffer
Treatment
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SECTION 3: MULTIPLE CHOICE
Answer the following questions. Select ALL answers that you feel are true. The use of
“sick” or “ill” here refers specifically to mental illness.
1. A person who has a mental disorder
a. cannot help being sick
b. is most likely to be cured through a conscious choice
c. is most likely to be cured with the help of a doctor
d. is most likely to be cured through his/her own efforts
2. How can one prevent sickness?
a. follow a doctor’s advice
b. exercise
c. eat right
d. all of the above
e. none of the above… there is no way to definitively keep from getting
sick
3. An evil person
a. is someone who chooses to do wrong
b. is a criminal
c. usually has a mental disorder
d. can usually also be described as “sick”
4. How does one change his/her state from evil to good?
a. only through conscious effort
b. only with the help of a loved one
c. by ceasing to do evil acts
d. a change to “good” will eventually occur regardless
5. Can some people be labeled both “sick” and “evil?”
a. yes, but that is rare
b. no, the nature of sickness is that a person is not responsible for their
condition, and responsibility is necessary to be considered evil
c. yes, a drug addict is an example of this overlap
d. yes, but when that happens, “sick” loses its normal meaning and
becomes more synonymous with “evil”
6. The difference between “evil” and “sick” is:
a. choosing to bring about one’s state
b. accountability for the consequences of one’s actions
c. degree of responsibility
d. the difference is very slight, the words are almost synonymous
7. What type of behavior would you describe as “evil?”
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a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Criminal behavior
moral sin
political scandal
the actions of an insane person
small offenses (to draw emphasis)

8. What type of behavior would you describe as “sick?”
a. Criminal behavior
b. moral sin
c. political scandal
d. the actions of an insane person
e. small offenses (to draw emphasis)
9. Do you use the terms “sick” and “evil” (and their synonyms) interchangeably?
a. Yes, when discussing severe criminal activity (e.g., homicide)
b. Yes, when discussing moral sin
c. Yes, when discussing despotic political leaders
d. Yes, when discussing mental disorders
e. Yes, when discussing things that I find repulsive
f. No, the words should not be used interchangeably
10. Do you use the phrase “sick and wrong?”
a. Yes, when something is both sick and wrong
b. Yes, by using synonyms I add emphasis to the offensiveness of a thing
c. No, because I don’t like to be redundant
d. No, because the words can seldom be used to describe the same thing

SECTION 4: ANECDOTAL JUDGMENT
Read the paragraph and answer the following questions.
1. Smith, a Vietnam veteran, who has a history of violent nightmares, and who once fired
an automatic weapon from the roof of his house with no memory of the incident, shoots
and kills his wife’s brother-in-law after his wife left him a second time. The shooting
occurred at midnight under foggy, humid conditions reminiscent of Smith’s scouting days
in Vietnam. He claims that he believed he was cleaning out a Vietnamese hut, a claim
that was bolstered by expert testimony that he was suffering from post-traumatic stress
syndrome.
Smith is:

a) not responsible for his actions.
b) partially responsible for his actions.
c) fully responsible for his actions.
d) fully responsible but justified in acting the way he did.
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2. Jones, a 60-year-old retired military person, shoots at a low-flying crop-duster,
puncturing the fuselage and causing the plane to crash, killing the pilot. Jones claims that
the plane was sent by the government to spy on him and to kill his animals, noting that
one of his dogs had died a few days before. There is no objective evidence that the
government has ever paid any attention to Jones.
Jones is:

a) not responsible for his actions.
b) partially responsible for his actions.
c) fully responsible for his actions.
d) fully responsible but justified in acting the way he did.

3. Jacobs is a policeman, who killed a person he had just arrested. Three psychiatrists
testify that he committed the crime as a result of an unconscious desire to be punished for
his failure to be home two years earlier, when his wife and small daughter were brutally
murdered. There are a string of incidents to illustrate chronic depression, threats of
suicide, bizarre behavior, and bursts of anger. Jacobs, after the shooting, surrenders to his
partner, saying, “I don’t know why I did it.”
Jacobs is:

a) not responsible for his actions.
b) partially responsible for his actions.
c) fully responsible for his actions.
d) fully responsible but justified in acting the way he did.

4. Sorenson is a battered woman who kills her husband following a particularly brutal
beating and after a long history of brutal beatings and humiliation. While the husband
was sleeping, Sorenson went to her mother’s house, found a gun there, and returned
home and shot her husband while he lay sleeping. Testimony on the battered woman
syndrome and learned helplessness was given.
Sorenson is:

a) not responsible for her actions.
b) partially responsible for her actions.
c) fully responsible for her actions.
d) fully responsible but justified in acting the way she did.
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5. Daniels killed his mother. Doctors testify that Daniels was suffering from
schizophrenia, and became convinced that his mother was a witch, casting spells on him.
He specifically thought she was casting a spell to make him impotent. His mother had
never abused him or neglected him, although she has always been somewhat distant.
Daniels is:

a) not responsible for his actions.
b) partially responsible for his actions.
c) fully responsible for his actions.
d) fully responsible but justified in acting the way he did.

SECTION 5: LIKERT SCALE
Indicate your perception of the following phrases and situations using a scale from 1-5
where:
1 = mentally ill, 2 = mostly mentally ill but with some evil intent, 3 = equally mentally ill
and evil, 4 = mostly evil but with some influence from mental illness, 5 = evil
The actions of Adolf Hitler with regard to his treatment of Jews and other non-Aryan
ethnic groups:
1
2
3
4
5
Failure to intervene in the commission of a crime when there is little danger to oneself:
1
2
3
4
5
A schizophrenic person who frequently steals from stores that he claims “owe him”:
1
2
3
4
5
Crimes of passion:
1
2
3

4

5

An unpopular boy who becomes a bully so others will think he is “cool”:
1
2
3
4
5
A wealthy person who steals for the thrill:
1
2
3
4
5
An intoxicated person who accidentally kills someone while driving:
1
2
3
4
5
A person with a social anxiety disorder who refuses to help even when it means saving a
person’s life with minimal effort:
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1

2

3

4

5

Crimes committed when under the influence of doctor-prescribed medication:
1
2
3
4
5
Racism
1
2

3

4

5

A drug addict who steals in order to buy more drugs:
1
2
3
4
5
Politically motivated genocide:
1
2
3
4
5
A head of household who is depressed and refuses to find work to support his/her family:
1
2
3
4
5
A person’s failure to exercise even though their obesity is causing them serious health
risks:
1
2
3
4
5
Addiction:
1
2

3

4

5

A person who brags constantly about accomplishments in order to win social acceptance:
1
2
3
4
5
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APPENDIX B: IRB LETTER OF APPROVAL

